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ABSTRACT
Leslie Dong: Asian Refugees
    Under the Direction of William Wei
The world is plagued by the largest refugee crisis since World War II. At this given time, there  
are more than 51 million displaced people around the world and nearly 35% of them originate from  
and remain in Asia. Due to the absence of developed regional institutions, refugee crises remain  
largely a state-to-state issue in Asia, making China (P.R.C.) a key player in addressing these crises.  
China's geographic location and its robust economic growth has not only made it an ideal haven for  
refugees, China's growing influence in Asia has also given it an unprecedented opportunity to establish  
itself as a leader in humanitarian crises. Because of the immense impact that China's refugee policies  
have on the surrounding region, this study seeks to examine how China formulates its refugee policies  
and why it adopts certain policies over others in different situations. By examining the driving factors  
for China's starkly different response to the Vietnamese refugee crisis (1978-1979) and the North  
Korean refugee crisis (since the 1990s), this study sheds light on China's policy considerations and its  
implications for the rest of Asia.
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Jan Egeland, the former Special Advisor to the United Nations Secretary General for Conflict 
Prevention and Resolution, recently brought attention to the global plight of refugees in an article titled  
“This is the Worst Refugee Crisis Since WWII. It's Time For Us to Rethink Our Response.” There were 
up to 28.8 million recorded refugees in 2012 and as many as 33.3 million in 2013.  Now at this given 
time, there are more than 51 million human beings around the globe that are forcibly displaced from 
their homes due to political conflicts, human rights abuses, starvation, and poverty. These numbers are 
the highest that has ever been recorded since World War II. 
While Egeland and the international community have acknowledged that we have entered into a 
new era of refugee crises, Asian refugee crises are often overlooked even though they present some of 
the most dire humanitarian issues of this age. Angus Francis and Rowena Maguire in Refugees and 
Displaced Persons in the Asia Pacific Region write, “The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) 2011 statistics on refugee populations residing by region are a stark reminder of 
the challenge facing states and civil society in the Asia Pacific. In 2011, Africa hosted 2,149,000 
refugees; the Americas, Europe, and Middle East and North Africa hosted 513,500, 1,605,500 and 
1,889,900 respectively, while the Asia Pacific hosted a staggering 3,793,900” (1). Nearly 35% of the 
world's refugees originate from Asia Pacific and 84% of these displaced refugees remain in Asia. 
Presented with these startling realities, the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) becomes a key 
actor in addressing these humanitarian crises in Asia. As this study shows, China still views refugee 
crises as largely a state-to-state affair and continues to adopt refugee policies that are predominantly 
driven by its own interests and motivations. The most important factor in determining China's refugee 
policies is the ethnicity of the refugees, followed by concerns about security and stability of the 
Chinese state. If the crisis involves refugees that are ethnically Chinese, China will adopt an approach 
centered around ethnic ties. But if the refugees are not ethnically Han, China will prioritize security and  
stability when formulating its refugee policies.
Dong 5
Even though these refugee policies are adequate and justifiable domestically, China has yet to 
realize its immense potential in humanitarian affairs. China is perhaps the only country in the Asia  
Pacific region whose domestic refugee policies can have a wide-spread impact on the surrounding 
region. Its response to Asian refugee crises will not only set a precedent for how other Asian countries 
should respond, it also has the potential to transform how the international community handles global 
refugee crises. This is an invaluable, springboard opportunity for China to establish itself as a reputable 
and influential leader in both Asia and in the world. 
What China needs to understand is that Asian refugee crises are not isolated, individual 
occurrences. They are part of a much bigger systematic issue in the region that 1) creates refugees and 
2) lacks the institutional capacity to effectively absorb and handle them. Asian refugee crises will not  
be resolved by adopting the "right" domestic policies, Asia desperately needs China to step up and pave 
the way in creating effective regional frameworks and institutions to handle these humanitarian crises.
As the United Nations Human Right's Council (UNHRC)'s Regional Representative for China 
and Hong Kong remarked, China's “opportune position” is partly due to the current structure of the 
international refugee regime. China is one of the only Asian states that has ratified both international  
and regional refugee treaties, including the “magna carta” of international refugee law which was 
established by the United Nations in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. These two treaties set out to accomplish two goals. 
First of all, they strove to establish a universal definition of a refugee and what criteria must be met in 
order for a person to be legally recognized as a refugee. According to the 1951 United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugee Resolution, a refugee is defined as “someone who is unable or unwilling to 
return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” and the Principle of  
“Non-Refoulement” is defined as “No contracting States shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in 
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any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened” 
("Part II Strategic Review Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153.").  
These two legal documents also attempted to set and promote a uniform standard in how states 
should respond to refugee crises. The 1951 Convention was able to achieve most of these goals while 
the 1967 Protocol helped remove geographic and temporal restrictions from the 1951 Convention.
While these two treaties were able to effectively lay out a comprehensive foundation for the 
treatment of refugees and continues to play a significant role in dealing with refugee crises today, they 
were largely rejected by Asian states. China is one of the only Asian state that has become a signatory 
of these two treaties in 1982 (Ho Security 56). The majority of Asian states reasoned that since these 
treaties were crafted in response to the European refugee crises following World War II, they were 
overly Eurocentric and unsuitable for handling Asian refugee crises. Governments in Japan, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Laos, and the Philippines also criticized the treaties for setting unrealistic financial  
expectations on how much developing states should contribute to incoming refugees. 
In addition to becoming one of the only Asian signatory states of the UN treaties, China is also a 
signatory of several regional agreements. The most prominent of which is the AALCC, a regional 
organization that allows Asian and African states to consult with each other about regional and 
international issues. It also established the Bangkok Principles of 1966, which acknowledge the 
existence of refugees and urge all member states to uphold the principle of non-refoulement and 
provide asylum for refugees. The Bangkok Principles are neither enforced or monitored, they only 
provide states with a legal guide on how to appropriately respond to refugee crises (Davis 563). The 
Bangkok Principles also has an important clause in its provision that states that the effect of these 
principles is limited if the security of the state is threatened. It is up to the each individual state to  
decide whether or not they will apply these principles in different situations. As a result, treatment of 
refugees remains largely a state-to-state issue and China is one of the most influential states in the 
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region as well as the largest stakeholder in these refugee crises. 
To start, China has consistently received large inflows of refugees from other Asian countries. 
According to the UNHRC's 2014 statistics on Asian Pacific refugees, Australia, the second largest host 
country for Asian refugees has over 34,000 refugees currently residing in Australia. China has a 
staggering 301,033, nearly ten times the number in Australia. The UNHRC's 2015 Subregional 
Operations Profile on East Asia and the Pacific claims that this is because “China is becoming a transit  
and destination country for mixed migration as a result of its geographical and economic importance.”  
By virtue of its geographic location, China has one of the largest land masses in the world as 
well as the largest number of bordering states. The 14 different sovereign states that border China show 
a great diversity in language, culture, history, and politics. With states ranging from Mongolia to 
Pakistan to Vietnam, many of these states share a checkered history with China and “mutual trust is not 
high in [this] region” (Lampton 246). Many of these neighboring states also present some of the most 
pressing refugee crises in the region. North Korea's authoritarian and oppressive regime caused a 
continuous flood of refugees into China's northeast borders since the late 1990s and civil wars in 
northeast Myanmar forced tens of thousands of Burmese refugees to seek asylum in China. 
The difficulty of guarding China's borders is also a contributing factor to the large presence of 
refugees. China has over 13,500 miles of international borders with more borderlands than any other 
country in the world.  While countries like the United States only needs to monitor two borders 
between Canada and Mexico, China has to secure borders between 14 different countries. Because of 
the inherent challenges of securing its borders, China has become a popular destination for refugees. 
McLaughlin in GlobalPost's Borderland: China's 14,000 mile struggle describes China's challenges in 
maintaining border security in the following quote:
There is the tightly controlled North Korean border, where armed soldiers on both sides of the 
line patrol with marked tension, looking for unwelcome refugees. The fluid border with 
Dong 8
Myanmar, where Chinese and Burmese cross back and forth with ease and open smuggling is a 
24-hour reality. The old Silk Road oasis of Kashgar, set within a stone's throw of multiple 
heated global conflict areas, including Kashmir, Pakistan and Afghanistan. And Guangzhou, 
where many of the plants and animals smuggled across China's borders end up for sale. 
Coupled with its geographic location, China's rapid economic development also presents a 
luring opportunity for people from bordering states. China's relative economic prosperity in comparison 
to its neighboring states creates a US-Mexico border scenario where people are incentivized to leave 
their native countries and enter into China to escape poverty. The economic lure of China is further 
accentuated by the growing labor shortage in China. Ronald Skeldon, in China: An Emerging  
Destination for Economic Migration, explains that because China is experiencing changes in its 
demographics because of low fertility rates, skewed gender ratio, and a rapidly aging population, this 
resulted in “[t]wo million job vacancies [...] in the southeast coastal region of China in 2004, and labor 
shortages spread north into the Yangtze River and the north coastal region in 2005.” The growing 
economic opportunities in China become highly attractive to economic migrants and refugees from 
bordering countries. 
Despite being a country that is familiar with the concept of displaced people, China lacks a 
clearly defined definition of a refugee. Even though China has an extensive history of dealing with 
various Asian refugee crises including the Indonesian refugee crisis (1959-1969), the Malaysian 
refugee crisis (1949-1953), the Vietnamese refugee crisis (1978-1979), and the North Korean refugee 
crisis (1997-present), Chinese discourse has rarely referred to these people as “refugees.” Instead, 
China has often referred to these displaced people with other classifications such as “returnees,” 
“economic migrants,” and “escapees” throughout history. While China does have the term “refugee,” it  
usually refers to refugees seeking asylum in countries outside of China instead of refugees entering into 
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the Chinese mainland.
China's definition and understanding of refugees is further complicated when placed in contrast 
to the UN's definition of a refugee. According to the 1951 United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugee Resolution, a refugee is defined as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their 
country of origin” because of well-founded threats to their human security if they were to return ("Part 
II Strategic Review Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153."). As one of the only signatory 
states of this resolution in Asia, China's definition of a refugee should be aligned with the UN and 
should also carry out refugee relief efforts based off of this agreement. China's recent treatment of the 
North Korean refugees however, clearly violates this resolution. 
In an attempt to escape poverty, starvation, and political oppression from the North Korean 
regime, a large numbers of North Koreans have smuggled their way into China. While most of them 
were drawn to China because of economic factors, the United Nations still regard them as refugees 
because they will face political persecution if deported back to North Korea. This is clearly articulated  
in the refoulement clause in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, which entitles the refugees to 
protection and prevents them from being sent back to their home country ("Part II Strategic Review 
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153"). 
Despite these claims, China has refused to acknowledge the North Koreans as refugees. A 
Chinese representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared publicly at a press conference that 
North Korean refugees are “illegal economic migrants” and are not refugees. Thus, they are not eligible 
for any form of protection from the Chinese government. The Chinese government has also actively 
rounded up and deported all such “escapees” back to North Korea. 
This case of North Korean refugees demonstrates that China has a very different definition for 
refugee than that of the United Nations. The numerous classifications that China has given to refugees 
(e.g. economic migrant, defectors, returnees, etc.) also complicates this definition, making it incredibly  
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difficult to establish a basis for comparison between different refugee cases. Thus, for the purpose of 
this paper, refugees will be defined by the UN definition, and all Chinese classifications that satisfy this 
definition will be referred to as refugees. Please refer to the chart below for all the refugee terms that  
will be used in this paper.
Chinese Refugee Term Romanization English Translations
脱北者／逃北者 Tuobeizhe/Taobeizhe Escapee
朝鲜叛逃者 Pantaozhe Defector
归侨 Quiqiao Returnee
经济难民 Jingji nanmin Economic Migrant 
N/A Kkotjebi Fluttering Swallows 
环境难民 Huanjing nanmin Environmental Refugees
难侨 Nanqiao Ethnic-Chinese Refugee 
归国 难侨 Guiguo Nanqiao Returnee-Refugee
Because of China's central role in the international refugee regime as well as its involvement in 
Asian refugee crises, it is crucial to understand China's policy response and how it formulates these 
official refugee policies. This study will first examine the arguments that have been commonly used to 
explain China's refugee policies and then test the validity of these arguments by applying them to two 
refugee cases (the Vietnamese and North Korean Refugee Crises), where China adopted drastically 
different policies. Finally, through a cross-comparison of these two cases, this study will illustrate how 
China formulates its refugee policies and examine the significance of these policies in shaping the 
regional and international response to Asian refugee crises. 
       Chapter 1: Research Methodology
Even though China is such an important player in Asian refugee crises, very little material has 
been published on its refugee policies as a whole. Multiple studies cover individual refugee cases with 
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the most prominent ones focusing on the ongoing North Korean and Burmese refugee crises, but few 
scholars have conducted comprehensive studies to examine how China formulates its refugee policies. 
As such, this study will be dedicated to examining how different factors drive China to adopt certain 
refugee policies over others. 
The independent variables in this study are the factors that potentially influence how China 
formulates its refugee policies, which include both domestic and international factors. The dependent  
variable then is the type of refugee policy that China adopts. This is the policy outcome that results  
from all the influencing factors (the independent variables). Since refugee policies show a wide range 
of variation, this study will only focus on two types of refugee policies: acceptance and non-acceptance 
policies. Acceptance policies are when China willingly accepts incoming refugees and provides asylum 
and assistance to help these refugees settle in China. Non-acceptance policies are when China refuses 
to provide asylum to the incoming refugees. The relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables in this study can be summarized by the following equation. 
Significant Factors (Independent Variables) → Type of Refugee Policy (Dependent Variable) 
The following section will explain the methodology used to examine the relationship between 
these variables. First, a list was compiled of all significant factors that can influence the formation of  
Chinese refugee policy. This was accomplished by combing through previously published material on 
Chinese refugee crises and identifying the major arguments that were most commonly used to explain 
China's policy decisions. These arguments were also drawn from a variety of sources such as 
newspapers, government press releases, and academic publications that documented notable cases 
where refugees flooded into China including the Indonesian Refugee Crisis in 1959, the Malayan 
Refugee Crisis in 1972, the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis in 1978, and the North Korean Refugee Crisis 
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in 1997. After filtering through these case studies, five major arguments were identified, centering 
around ethnic ties, economic development, international status, regional security/geopolitics, and social  
security. These arguments help establish a basis for comparison between different refugee case studies.
Secondly, these five arguments will then be applied to two different refugee cases where China 
adopted starkly different policies. The first one will be focused on the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis 
(1978-1979) where China adopted an acceptance policy and the second one will be centered around the 
North Korean Refugee Crisis where China adopted a strict, non-acceptance policy. By applying these 
five arguments to these two refugee cases, it will help shed light on the validity of each argument in 
explaining China's response to the different crises. 
Thirdly, both refugee crises will be examined side by side. By placing the findings of the five 
arguments in both the Vietnamese and North Korean Refugee Crises together, it will help determine the 
validity and effectiveness of these arguments in explaining China's response to both crises. It will also 
shed light on other underlying political rationales and motives that may influence China's policy-
making process.
Finally, all significant findings and trends will be compiled and analyzed closely. This section 
will examine the significance of these findings and what it means for China's policy decisions and for 
future refugee crises in the Asia Pacific region. Policy recommendations will also be provided for how 
China should manage refugee crises in the future to best enhance its position as a rising leader in both 
Asia and in the world. This following section will define these five arguments and provide background 
information about their origin.
1.1 Ethnic Ties Argument 
The ethnic ties argument contends that close ethnic ties between incoming refugees and the 
Chinese populace play a significant role in shaping Chinese refugee policies. According to the 
Dong 13
argument, refugees that share close ethnic ties to China significantly increase the likelihood that China  
will adopt an acceptance refugee policy. The opposite will also be true. If the refugees do not share 
close ethnic ties to China then China will likely adopt a non-acceptance policy. While this concept of  
ethnic ties will be applied primarily on refugees for the course of this study, this concept was originally 
derived from the Theory of Counter-Disasporic Migration and Ethnically-Privileged Migration.
Counter-Disasporic Migration refers to the “return of later-generation diasporic descendants to 
an ancestral homeland” (Ho Returnee 601). It suggests that because of a commonality in “roots, 
identity, and belonging,” diasporic descendants that grew up abroad are prompted to return to their 
native home” (601). At the same time when diasporic descendants are motivated to return, ancestral  
homelands also provide them with priority admission and special rights based solely off of their 
perceived ethnic affinities. An example of this is Israel's Law of Return, which provides Jews that 
reside abroad a right to return to Israel and attain citizenship. The Japanese government also adopted 
similar preferential immigration policies for the nikkeijin who are people of Japanese descent but hold 
foreign citizenship. While the nikkeijin are not entitled to Japanese citizenship, the Japanese 
government does give them preferential immigration visas (Ho Returnee 601). 
A variety of rationales have been adopted that attempt to explain why states are likely to grant  
preferential immigration rights to “co-ethnics.” The most common rationale focuses on a state's  
identity. If a state regards itself as an ancestral homeland, it feels compelled to not only provide for the 
current citizens that reside within its borders, but to also act as a protector of co-ethnics in times of  
distress. Co-ethnics that return to the ancestral homeland as refugees is an appropriate example of this.  
In addition to feeling responsible toward co-ethnics abroad, a state may adopt preferential immigration 
policies as a way to protect its own reputation as an ancestral homeland. By preserving this image, a 
state can gain support from the greater pan-ethnic community and can entitle a state to a variety of  
benefits. It can help legitimize a state's political power, channel in outside investments or can even 
Dong 14
translate into “political mileage for ruling elites acting in the name of national interest and wider state  
security” (Ho Security 58). Because of these reasons, China may be prompted to intervene if the 
incoming refugees are of Chinese descent. 
1.2 Economic Argument
The economic argument suggests that refugee policies are primarily driven by economic factors. 
China's decision to adopt an acceptance or non-acceptance policy depends on the overall, perceived  
economic impact of receiving the refugees. If the perceived economic costs of receiving the refugees 
are greater than the perceived economic benefits, then China will likely adopt a non-acceptance policy.  
But if the economic benefits of receiving the refugees outweigh the economic costs, China will likely 
implement an acceptance policy. 
A report from the UN titled Social and Economic Impact of Large Refugee Populations on Host  
Developing Countries explains that large refugee populations can either put a huge strain on a receiving 
country's economy or positively spur economic growth. It could also have both of these effects at 
different times in the resettlement process. When there are large influxes of refugees into a country, it  
can strain all economic resources and pit refugee populations against local communities in competition  
for water, food, land, housing, and medical services. Over time, these refugee populations can also lead 
to greater demands on education and health facilities, energy, transportation, social services and 
employment as well as other natural resources. At the same time however, refugee influxes can bring 
about a variety of economic benefits.
A large presence of refugees can help stimulate the host country's economy in a variety of ways. 
For example, refugee influxes can bring in a valuable new source of labor, both skilled and unskilled, 
to the host country. Refugees that are highly educated, skilled, or possess a business background can 
help generate new jobs in the host country or fill in for more specialized jobs such as in the medical or 
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teaching fields. Unskilled refugees on the other hand, can become a valuable labor force that helps 
open up and develop the entire country. Refugees in general, also constitute a new consumer market for 
domestic goods like food, shelter, daily necessities, and services. 
In addition to this, large refugee populations also help host countries attract a outside 
investment. For example, if the incoming refugees are ethnically-Chinese, they are likely to have 
extensive connections to overseas Chinese communities and help channel in remittances and 
investment from extended family members and relatives from all over the world. As Ho wrote in 
Irregular Migration and Human Security in East Asia, “China continued to keep a watchful eye on its 
co-ethnics, regarding them as sources of remittances, philanthropic contributions and potential political  
allies” (Ho Security 60). Accepting large influxes of refugees can also attract a variety of development 
agencies into the host country and entitle the host country to development support from the 
international community including the United Nations, refugee relief NGOs, and other international  
organizations. 
Because refugees can have a positive or negative impact on domestic economies, the economic 
argument contends that China will formulate refugee policies based on the overall, perceived economic 
impact of the refugees. China will weigh the benefits versus the costs associated with accepting the 
refugees. If China perceives the economic benefits to be greater than the economic strains, it will likely 
adopt a refugee acceptance policy. If China perceives the costs to be greater than the benefits then 
China will likely adopt a non-acceptance refugee policy. 
1.3 International Status Argument 
China's international status is defined by its international image, prestige, and influence vis a vis 
another country, regime, or its own position in the international community. This argument contends 
that China will only adopt refugee policies, either acceptance and non-acceptance, that can effectively  
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bolster China's international status. This argument is grounded on the assumption that the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), the founding and ruling party of the P.R.C has a desire to secure its political 
legitimacy and increase its soft power and global influence. 
China's desire to elevate its international status can be traced back to the Chinese Communist  
Party and their rival, the Kuomintang (KMT)'s struggle for power over the mainland in 1927. 
According to David Wu in The Living Tree, “After the Nationalist government was established in 
Nanjing in 1928 following the Northern Expedition, China entered a period of 'political tutelage' under 
the authoritarian rule of the Kuomingtang party” targeting the Chinese education system (Wu 153).
Even though the KMT's establishment was almost a century ago and fled to modern-day 
Taiwan, the KMT's influence has effectively spread to various overseas Chinese communities all over 
the world. Wu writes, “This kind of national indoctrination was also brought to overseas Chinese 
schools via branch organizations of the Kuomintang party and other overseas Chinese organizations, 
including the Overseas Chinese Commission of the Nationalist government […] Even today the 
commission regularly sponsors cultural and educational activities in North America and Europe, under 
the guise of promoting Chinese cultural tradition, in order to induce loyalty to the Nationalist  
government in Taiwan” (Wu 153). These movements have helped the KMT establish a strong presence 
in overseas Chinese communities. 
In order to combat the KMT's overseas influence, the CCP is prompted to reach out to and win 
support from overseas Chinese communities. Adopting refugee policies that appeal to overseas Chinese 
communities is an effective way to do this. Even though refugee policies tend to receive less press and 
attention, they can be incredibly effective in projecting an altruistic, humanitarian image of the CCP in  
times of crisis. If the refugees in question are of Chinese descent, China can strategically adopt certain 
policies to project an image of “caring concern” (Gilks 197) to overseas Chinese communities. This can 
help legitimize China as an ancestral homeland to all Chinese descendants and as the rightful  
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“protector” and “caretaker” of all overseas Chinese communities. 
China can also effectively bolster its own influence and status in the international community by 
adopting refugee policies that are aligned with western values. This can help present China as a team 
player in global politics and as a country that is willing to comply with international norms. China's  
actions during the Vietnamese refugee crisis are a good example of this. By unconditionally accepting 
the Vietnamese refugees and implementing a large-scale relocation policy, China was able to win 
support and recognition from influential international organizations. Liang Shuying in “Refugee 
Protection in China: The Issue of Citizenship and Potential Solutions” wrote, “When China's State 
Councillor Tang Jiaxuan met with Antonio Gutettes, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees on 22 March 2006, he stated that China places great emphasis on the importance of refugee 
protection, has fulfilled its obligations by implementing practical measures, and actively and 
constructively cooperated with the international community” (67). This in turn, effectively bolsters  
China's international status and influence. 
1.4 Regional Security/Geopolitics
The regional security/geopolitics argument contends that China's refugee policies are largely 
shaped by China's concerns about border and regional security. As a country that is surrounded by 14 
different sovereign states ranging from Vietnam to India to Kyrgyzstan and is also surrounded by a 
great diversity of cultures, languages, history, and politics that are distinctly different, China views this  
proximity and diversity with caution. Each border region has different security challenges that must be 
handled differently in each location. Because of this, China views its border security with utmost 
importance. 
Li Guogang, the deputy director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Center for China's 
Borderland History and Geographic Studies explains, “China has a single border policy and it's quite 
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simple: stability. If the borders in China are not stable, all of China will be unstable. If the border areas 
are not developed, all of China will be undeveloped. We can say the border areas are extremely 
important, throughout history” (qtd. in Mclaughlin Struggle). 
Given this emphasis on maintaining border security, China tends to view refugees and large 
influxes of people moving in between Chinese borders as a great threat to national security. China is 
extremely cautious of all refugee crises that occur close to or around its borders. As a result, China will 
strategically select and allow refugees to enter into its borders based on the geographic region that the 
refugees originate from. Fearing that accepting refugees can destabilize border regions and destabilize 
the Chinese mainland, China will be more likely to accept refugees from borderlands that are more 
stable than refugees from borderlands that are more prone to instability. 
This was one of the most common rationales for China's response to the North Korean refugee 
crisis. Song explained that because “a mass exodus from North Korea may destabilize the [Chinese] 
north-eastern border region” (162), China had no choice but to adopt a strict, non-acceptance policy 
and actively secure the Sino-North Korean border. China's evaluation of a borderland's stability can 
also be due to a variety of factors including the susceptibility of these regions to political uprisings,  
ethnic tensions, and humanitarian crises.
This same logic about refugees can also be extended to larger geographic regions such as 
Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. While China has historically viewed both of these regions to be of 
great strategic value, especially during the Cold War, there is a discrepancy in how much China values 
each region. While China has had ongoing historic ties with Southeast Asia that traces back to the time 
of Chinese tributary states like Annan (modern-day Vietnam), Northeast Asia has consistently been 
regarded as a region of upmost strategic value. Not only does northeast China possess some of the most 
valuable economic resources in the entire country, North Korea in many ways can be understood as a 
gateway right into the heart of China. Choi in China's Strategic View of the Korean Peninsula, 
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explained that “Traditionally, China has regarded the Korean peninsula as a key factor that affects the 
security of the mainland. The peninsula has often been described as a “dagger” aimed at China that 
shares a geopolitical “curse” with China” (75). Any insecurity in Northeast Asia can have dire 
consequences for China. Because of this discrepancy in the strategic value of different regions, China 
will be more likely to accept refugees from regions that are of less strategic value such as Southeast 
Asia versus regions that are of great strategic value like Northeast Asia in fear that accepting any 
refugees will have severe ramifications in the stability of the region and in mainland China.  
This stress on regional security can also prompt China to view refugees as a part of a larger 
picture of geopolitics. While China may adopt refugee policies in an attempt to bolster regional  
stability, these policies can also have implications in the balance of power in that specific region. For  
example, China may have adopted a strict no-acceptance policy in the case of the North Korean 
refugees in an attempt to maintain stability in both the China-North Korean border region as well as the 
Northeast Asian region. But by enacting this refugee policy and strengthening current Sino-North 
Korean relations, it can impact the balance of power between several major players in that region 
including Japan, the United States, Russia, and South Korea. These geopolitical concerns can be just as 
significant as considerations about border and regional security. 
 
1.5 Social Security 
A press release published from the World Economic Forum titled China as a Global Player 
explains that China's greatest political priority is to maintain stability at home. As David Lampton  
writes: 
Throughout Chinese history there has been a belief that as internal conditions deteriorate, 
external forces seek to take advantage of that weakness to pursue their own goals and exploit a 
supine China. The Chinese formulation is nei luan, wai huan, a relaxed translation of which is, 
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'When there is turmoil within, the barbarians from without inflict disasters.' Or, as the scholar-
general Zeng Guofan put it positively in the mid-nineteeth century, 'If you can rule your own 
country, who dares to insult you? (208)
This stress on maintaining social security within the Chinese state is a consistent and 
reoccurring theme throughout Chinese history and is embodied in the term a “peaceful rise” that was 
coined in 2003. President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao used this phrase to “reassure the outside 
world (particularly the PRC's neighbors and Washington) that China's ascendance would not follow the 
destructive paths of Germany and Japan in the first half of the twentieth century” and pose a threat to 
the rest of the world (Lampton 33). By taking this stance, China hoped that it would prevent other 
states from taking actions to thwart its development and jeopardize its social security. 
China's consistent emphasis on maintaining social security is due to the unique challenges of 
governing the state. China has one of the largest land masses in the world with diverse terrain ranging 
from the humid, coastal areas in the east, the mountainous regions scattered throughout the country, and 
the arid, desert-like landscapes in the west. The sheer mass of China plus the geographic diversity of its 
territory makes governing China an impressive feat, but in addition to this, China also has the largest 
population of people in the world and a rich diversity of ethnic groups, languages, and customs. The 
sheer amount of people that China needs to govern can easily exacerbate any domestic issues within the 
country, making social security not only an ideal condition but a necessity in order to govern China. 
Building on this assumption that social security is the priority of the Chinese state, this 
argument contends that China will only adopt refugee policies that help maintain or bolster social  
security. Before adopting a refugee policy, China will likely examine and evaluate the projected social  
costs of accepting large influxes of refugees. These social costs will account for all the domestic 
resources that will need to be allocated to the refugees when they arrive such as land, housing, jobs, 
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and food as well as concerns about the impact the refugees will have on local communities. China may 
also have fears that incoming refugees will cause social unrest, increase the rate of crime, and 
exacerbate ethnic tensions.
It is also important to note that these evaluations are based on China's perception of the social 
costs associated with accepting the refugees. Because of this, the ethnic identity of the refugees can 
play a significant role in influencing China's evaluation of these social costs. For instance, Elaine Ho in 
'Refugee' or 'returnee'? The Ethnic Geopolitics of Diasporic Resettlement in China and  
Intergenerational Change argues that China was willing to accept large numbers of Vietnamese 
refugees because the majority of them were ethnically Han and would thus, “cohere easily with the 
indigenous population [in China], which is bound by kinship obligations” (601).
Nevertheless, the social security argument contends that China's refugee policies are adopted 
based off of an overall assessment of the social costs associated with accepting refugees. China will 
likely adopt a refugee acceptance policy if the perceived social cost of accepting the refugees are low,  
but will adopt a non-acceptance policy if the perceived social costs are high. 
Chapter Two: Refugee Cases
The Vietnamese and North Korean refugee crises were specifically selected for this study 
because they are comparable in size and reveal an inconsistency in China's refugee policies, providing 
the perfect space to examine how China develops its policies. 
Even though there is a large range in the estimations, the number of Vietnamese and North 
Korean refugees are comparable. Lee explains that “The exact figure of North Koreans in China is 
unknown. The PRC government estimates 10,000-50,000; the ROK claims 30,000-50,000; the US 
State Department says 75,000-125,000; the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) opts for 50,000-100,000; and the NGOs say 100,000-300,000. In its 2009 report, the US 
Dong 22
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants estimates that around 11,000 North Koreans remained in 
hiding in or near the border” (Song 162). At the same time, estimates for the Vietnamese refugees also 
show a large range because the numbers often overlap with other Southeast Asian refugees that flooded 
into China around the same time. These include refugees from Malaya, Indonesia, Laos, and Cambodia 
that are often grouped under the umbrella term “Indochinese Refugees.” While Han estimates that from 
“Vietnam alone, more than 200,000 co-ethnics arrived in China under forced migration circumstances,”  
(Han qtd. Ho 56) Chinese reports claim that the UNHCR's Beijing office helped settle up to 300,000 
Vietnamese refugees following the Sino-Vietnamese War (Zhao). Nevertheless, the upper range in the 
estimates of both North Korean and Vietnamese refugees is between 100,000-300,000.   
These two crises also reveal an inconsistency in China's refugee policies. While China had 
shared a similar relationship with both Vietnam and North Korea against the backdrop of the Cold War, 
China responded to each crisis very differently. Not only did China form a political and strategic 
alliance with both of these countries, all three states were active members of the communist bloc during 
the Cold War. All three countries were dedicated to fighting a war against the Western democracy and 
supported a global communist revolution. 
Both Vietnam and North Korea also presented a similar strategic significance to China. Since 
Vietnam and North Korea both share a border with Chinese mainland, China viewed both of these 
countries as ideal buffer zones (Niu 366) that would shield China from American presence in Asia. This 
is one of the many reasons why China felt compelled to enter both the Korean and Vietnam War after 
American military forces threatened to overtake both of these countries. If Vietnam and North Korea 
fell to American forces, there would no longer be a buffer zone that could shield China from the United 
States. 
Apart from the similar strategic relationship that China shared with both of these countries, 
Vietnam and North Korea also shared distinct similarities. Both countries suffered through a civil war 
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that centered around ideological differences and ultimately resulted in the split of both countries. North 
Korea and North Vietnam (at the time) supported a communist regime while South Korea and South 
Vietnam advocated for democracy. The civil wars that broke out in these countries eventually turned 
into proxy wars within the larger Cold War landscape. 
Despite these similarities, China's response to both crises was drastically different. The Chinese 
government was incredibly accommodating to the Vietnamese refugees that flooded into Chinese 
borders in the late 1970s and implemented a full-scale relocation and settlement program  to help 
Vietnamese refugees settle into China. On the other hand, China maintained a strict policy against  
North Korean refugees. Not only did China refuse to acknowledge North Korean “escapees” as 
refugees, Chinese law enforcement actively sought out North Korean citizens in China and repatriated 
all refugees back to North Korea (The Invisible Exodus: North Korean in the PRC). 
Because of China's starkly different approaches to handling both crises, examination of both 
cases will provide insight in the reasons and the motivations that drove China to adopt the refugee 
policies that it did in both cases. 
2.1 Vietnamese Refugee Crisis
While the majority of the literature on Vietnamese refugees documents the mass exodus that 
followed the fall of Saigon, this paper centers on the Hoa Crisis that occurred a few years after the 
reunification of Vietnam. The Hoa Crisis refers to the two waves of Vietnamese refugees that flooded 
into China starting in the late 1970s due to the regime's increasingly oppressive economic policies and 
the collapse of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. The first wave occurred in the late 1970s to early 1980s 
and the second wave occurred in the late 1980s to early 1990s. 
While the initial reunification of Vietnam has been described as one of the smoothest transitions 
of power, the communist regime became increasingly repressive over time. Shortly after 1975, various 
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programs were implemented to solidify the communist rule and transform the capitalist Vietnamese 
economy to a socialist economy. These policies uprooted hundreds of thousands of “capitalists” and 
forcibly sent them to “re-education” camps, New Economic Zones, or state farms to work as 
agricultural workers.
The most prominent group of people that were targeted by these reforms was the Hoa, who 
were ethnically Chinese. At the time of reunification, there were an estimated one to two million Hoa 
living in Vietnam with the highest concentrations located in southern Vietnam. The Hoa were highly 
represented in private business and trade, making up a high percentage of Vietnam's educated and 
upper class. The Hoa's association with capitalist activity was not the only reason why they were 
targeted by the regime. Because they were ethnically Chinese, the Vietnamese government also feared 
that they were fifth columns or spies for the China. Gilks in Breakdown of Sino-vietnamese Alliance  
1970-1979 argued that “Hanoi was particularly eager to wrest control from the ethnic Chinese, whose 
loyalty was suspect and who might be open to manipulation by Beijing” (193).
During one violent operation in April 1978, the Vietnamese regime confiscated over 30,000 
private businesses that belonged to the Hoa people. The regime actively forced the Hoa into New 
Economic Zones, conscripted them into the military, and enforced “restrictions over the use of Chinese 
names and language learning. [The Hoa] were also subjected to claims of divided loyalties, [and] 
random or organized acts of violence” (Ho Security 59). The regime's persecution of the Hoa continued 
until the regime started a full-scale purge of the Hoa. While the Hoa were not the only people to be 
persecuted in Vietnam, they constituted approximately 80 percent of the Vietnamese refugees.  
Estimates for the number of Vietnamese refugees range from 100,000-300,000 (Zhao). 
In the wake of the Hoa Crisis, the Chinese government responded by implementing an 
unprecedented refugee policy and provided “unconditional acceptance” to all Vietnamese refugees. In  
addition to opening its borders to these refugees, China sent the ships, Changli and Minghua (Gilks 
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203) to actively bring the “persecuted Chinese” back to China and at first, allowed refugees free entry 
with or without proper travel documents into China. Yet, when the swelling number of refugees seeking 
asylum into China continued to increase, the Chinese government eventually reversed this policy and 
only accepted refugees that received proper exit visas from the Vietnamese government. 
When the refugees arrived, the Chinese government initiated a full-scale relocation program and 
helped them settle in China. According to Fan Shouyi in Now That They Have Come, We Must Help  
Them Settle Down: An Investigation of the Living Conditions of 200,000 Vietnamese Refugees in  
China, “[L]ocal governments accept[ed] all refugees with no strings attached; and [...] provided these 
penniless refugees with food, clothing and shelter for free” (14). A grand total of 263 state-owned farms 
or resettlement camps were also set up throughout the Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, Jiangxi, and 
Fujian provinces to accommodate the refugees. The Chinese government then joined efforts with local 
authorities to provide the refugees with job opportunities in agriculture, fishing, and mining. 
Vietnamese refugees that were unfamiliar with these fields were offered job training and given the 
necessary tools to enter these occupations (Refugees in China). For skilled refugees like teachers and 
doctors, the Chinese government tried to match their skill sets to respective jobs. 
China's official resettlement programs ended in 1988 but the Chinese government has never 
stopped providing financial and material support and aid to these Vietnamese refugees (Zeng). Even 
when the UN ended various supportive programs for Vietnamese refugees in 1991, China continued to 
subsidize the refugees' living expenses and provided them with free work training and education 
programs. 
More than thirty years later, these refugees have fully integrated into the Chinese society and 
considered themselves to be Chinese people. The Chinese government also allows the refugees' 
children to attend local schools and take the entrance exams to attend Chinese universities. 
China's response to this refugee crisis has gained international recognition.  Fan wrote, “29 
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years later, on May 10, 2007, the Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) highly 
acclaimed the Chinese government's efforts to make arrangements for settling the refugees in China, 
saying that over the past 30 years or so, China's placement of Vietnamese refugees within its borders is 
one of the most successful models for settlement of refugees” (14). China's response to this crisis 
played an unprecedented role in shaping the responsibility of states in handling refugee crises. The 
following section will examine how effective the five arguments are at explaining China's response to 
the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis.
2.11 Ethnic Ties Argument
The ethnic ties argument is one of the most effective arguments in explaining China's refugee 
policy during the Vietnamese refugee crisis. As Ho explains, “expulsion from Southeast Asia was 
authorized by the sending states and their resettlement in China endorsed by the receiving state on 
account of their co-ethnicity” (Ho security 56). The significance of the refugees' ethnic ties to China 
was evident in how China justified its legal jurisdiction over the refugees as well as its treatment of the 
refugees after they arrived in China. 
China had tactfully employed the ethnicity of the refugees as a way to justify its extraterritorial  
reach over the refugees. Even though reports showed that 80% of the Vietnamese refugees that flooded 
into China's borders from 1978-1979 were ethnically Chinese, they did not fall immediately under 
China's jurisdiction. While the majority of the refugees were ethnically Chinese, a great portion of them 
were naturalized and became Vietnamese citizens, especially refugees that had resided in South 
Vietnam. Because of this, the Vietnamese government claimed jurisdiction over the refugees based off  
of their nationality and China claimed jurisdiction based off of the refugees' ethnicity. Even though 
China “questioned whether those who naturalised abroad did so willingly or under compulsion by the 
governments in their countries of residence” (Suryadinata qtd. in Ho 603), China was cautious not to 
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overstep these legal boundaries. Doing so will appear as an interference in another state's domestic 
affairs and a violation of China's promises in the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, a set of 
principles developed to govern the relations between Asian states in 1954. Because of this, it was 
difficult for China to assume responsibility for the refugees.
In order to justify its claim over the refugees, Chinese political discourse eventually labeled the 
refugees as “returnees” instead of refugees. By packaging the refugees as “returnees,” China suggested 
an element of choice rather a forced migration. The Qiaoban, a government agency that managed the 
resettlement of the refugees required all refugees to “renounce their foreign nationalities to signal their  
return 'voluntarily' [to China]” (Ho Returnee 603). As long as the refugees were willing to renounce 
their foreign nationalities, China would accept them as rightful citizens of China. Employing this  
categorization of the refugees helped legitimize China's extraterritorial reach over the refugees. 
China also actively employed the ethnicity of the refugees to justify their preferential treatment  
when they arrived in China. While the Vietnamese refugees “enjoy[ed] basic rights to life, production,  
employment, education, and medical care […] for non-Indochinese refugees […] there is no right to 
employment and the UNHCR provides assistance in terms of food, basic accommodation, health care 
and primary education” (UNHCR 2011 Statistics). China's preferential treatment of the Vietnamese 
refugees was not only restricted to refugee populations. The Chinese government also gave preferential 
treatment over the local Chinese citizenry. Ho documents how a Vietnamese refugee recalled that “food 
vouchers distributed to returnees under the commune system provided them with 29 jin of rice 
compared to non-returnees, who could only have 25 jin” (Ho Security 62). According to Godley, many 
of the Vietnamese refugees also continued to “receive government sponsored food packages despite a 
widespread shortage” (qtd in Ho 604). As a result, this triggered resentment from local populations who 
viewed the refugees as scroungers that had a dependency mentality and relied on government 
assistance. 
Dong 28
In order to justify these preferential policies, national Chinese news reports evoked the refugees' 
ethnicity and portrayed them as patriotic, loyal descendants that voluntarily returned back to their  
homeland. China's use of the word “return” is especially noteworthy. In common forced migration 
literature, “return” is defined as the “repatriation to the country refugees left but consider home” (Black  
qtd. in Ho 601) so in this case, “return” should refer to the Vietnamese refugees' return back to 
Vietnam. But 'return' in this Chinese context suggests that the refugees were returning back to their 
ancestral homeland – a place of belonging and ethnic attachment. By appealing to these ethnic ties, the  
Chinese government effectively portrayed the refugees as “us” rather than the “other” and justified the 
need to protect and provide for other, fellow Chinese. 
At the same time that China drew on the ethnic identities of the refugees, it also alluded to its  
own responsibilities as an ancestral homeland. National new reports portrayed the refugees as 
“vulnerable [Chinese] populations without protection in their adopted homelands” (Ho Security 59). 
Because the refugees lacked this protection and China was their ancestral home, China had the “right to 
take action, assert extraterritorial protection for the co-ethnics in distress, and mobilize domestic  
support for the resettlement policies” (Waver qtd. in Ho Security 59). Waver has identified this as a 
type of “speech act” (Ho Security 59) that targeted the local Chinese citizenry and legitimized China's  
treatment of the refugees. 
While Chinese discourse repeatedly appealed to the refugees' ethnicity to justify its treatment of 
them, it also displayed China's underlying attitudes towards themselves. China did in fact, view itself as 
an ancestral homeland for the Hoa people and strongly believed that it had an obligation to protect and 
provide for them. The Hoa's ethnic ties to China were not just a justification for why China adopted the 
policies that it did, but a driving reason why they adopted these preferential policies to begin with. This  
concept of ethnic ties is a reoccurring theme throughout all five arguments and in almost all discussions 
about the Vietnamese refugees. 
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2.12 Economic Argument 
The economic argument, which contends that the formation of China's refugee policies is 
largely driven by economic factors is consistent with China's response to the Vietnamese refugee crisis. 
The economic benefits of accepting the Vietnamese refugees greatly outweighed the economic costs. 
At the onset of the Vietnamese refugee crisis, the Chinese economy was in dire condition. After 
suffering through the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese economy was left 
in shambles after years of neglect, ineffective economic policies, and a lack of investment in human 
capital. In an attempt to rejuvenate the Chinese economy, Deng Xiaoping enacted the “Four 
Modernizations” in 1978 to bolster up the fields of industry, agriculture, national defense, and science 
and technology. When the Vietnamese refugees crisis broke out, the refugees presented themselves as a 
great economic opportunity and potential asset to China. 
To start, the Vietnamese refugees provided a new source of human capital and labor for China. 
Unlike the North Korean refugees who suffered from poverty, starvation, and had very few job skills, 
the Hoa dominated the business and commercial sectors of the Vietnamese economy and were also 
highly represented in private business, trade, and also made up a high percentage of Vietnam's upper 
class. As a group of highly educated and skilled laborers, the Hoa were viewed as a valuable source of 
human capital that could spur China's economic growth and reform. After recognizing the refugees' 
skills and talents, local Chinese governments deliberately matched the skill sets of the refugees to 
corresponding occupations in China. In the Chinese news investigation titled, Vietnamese refugees in  
China, Tu explains that after 1980, all refugees that were cultured, skilled, or highly educated were 
directed to specialized jobs in schools, hospitals, factories, and government departments.
Unskilled refugees on the other hand, provided a new source of labor to help open up and 
develop rural areas in China. “According to the settlement policy of the local government, refugees 
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with skills were settled in the city and mostly worked in plastic or food factories and schools. The ones 
without skills worked on farms” (Wain). The majority of the unskilled Vietnamese refugees were 
settled in rural and largely uninhabited areas throughout Guangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian provinces, 
following in the footsteps of the Indonesian-Chinese and Malaya-Chinese refugees that came before 
them from 1949-1969.
Similar to the Vietnamese refugees, these Indonesian and Malaysian refugees fled into China to 
escape oppressive governments and ethnic persecution. Once they arrived in China, they were resettled 
in rural, impoverished, and undeveloped farms and were expected to help open up and develop the 
land. Ho explains that:
The refugee-returnees from Malaya and Indonesia […] became pioneers in preparing the land 
for agriculture and building housing, factories, roads or other facilities for the farms […] During 
interviews, some recounted that the soil on the undeveloped land was hard and of such poor 
quality that tilling the land proved to be back-breaking labour for them. But they had little 
choice because the party officials that managed the farms would not give them food provisions 
under the commune system otherwise (63). 
Even though the “Vietnamese-Chinese are reportedly 'of a lower quality than the [earlier 
returnees from Indonesia]” (Ho Security 64), the Chinese government reasoned that as Chinese 
descendants, the refugees had an ancestral duty to their homeland and should contribute to the 
development of China in the same way that other ethnically-Chinese refugees did in the past. Because 
of these reasons, many of the Vietnamese refugees were sent to the same farms that the earlier Malaya 
and Indonesian refugees settled or relocated to farms that had equally challenging living conditions. 
Secondly, a large presence of Vietnamese refugees can attract a variety of outside investments 
into China. The Hoa were part of a closely-knit community of overseas Chinese. These ties prompted 
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close family members, relatives, and friends to send economic remittances back to China to support the 
refugees. The Chinese government was aware of this economic value of the refugees even before the 
Vietnamese Refugee Crisis broke out. Ho explained that “China continued to keep a watchful eye on its  
co-ethnics, regarding them as sources of remittances, philanthropic contributions, and potential political  
allies” (Ho Security 60). 
Accepting the refugees will also entitle China to developmental support from the international 
community. A UNHRC report titled Social and economic impact of large refugee populations on host  
developing countries explained that “The presence of refugees […] can attract development agencies to 
the host areas. While infrastructure is developed in the initial stage primarily to facilitate the work of  
host governments, UNHCR and its implementing partners in the refugee affected regions, it can also 
serve as a catalyst to 'open up' the host region to development efforts that would otherwise never reach 
these 'marginal' areas.” The Chinese news investigation titled, Vietnamese Refugees in China explains 
that the Guangxi province alone was able to secure 4,851,000 USD from the United Nations World 
Food Programme, 15,000 GBP from the British Overseas Aid Group (BOAG), 1,356,300 FRF from the 
French Medical Association, and 32,853,200 USD from the United Nations Human Rights Council in 
developmental support. These funds helped establish 187 different developmental programs and 
provided the refugees with additional resources in healthcare, education, job training, and employment.  
Not only did these funds dramatically improve the living conditions of the refugees, it also played a 
significant role in developing the rural areas and farmlands where the refugees relocated. 
Thirdly, the Vietnamese refugees' multiculturalism was able to help boost local economies in 
south China. “[T]he re-territorialised cultural identities of the refugee–returnees intersect with the re-
scaling of state power in the post-1980s, resulting in the distinctive reinvention of the overseas Chinese 
farms as economic zones and tourism sites featuring ‘Southeast Asia’ in China” (Ho Returnee 605). 
Many of these refugee camps that housed the Vietnamese refugees were transformed into tourist sites 
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that provided an insight to the diverse and exotic cultures of Southeast Asia as well as the humanitarian 
efforts that China had offered at the time of the crisis. Even though this restructuring of the refugee 
camps occurred after the refugees were permanently settled into China, these sites became key tourist  
attractions that generated a significant amount of revenue for local economies. 
Even though the Chinese government bore substantial costs in the initial resettlement of the 
refugees in providing them with housing, food, and other basic necessities, the economic value and 
contributions of the refugees far outweighed these costs. Apart from the direct contributions of the 
refugees and the international community, the investment that China was able to attract from overseas  
Chinese communities alone, played a significant role in rebuilding the Chinese economy. Lampton 
contends that a good proportion of China's current economic success can be traced back to the 
“financial, managerial, intellectual, and marketing resources that ethnic Chinese living outside China  
have brought to the PRC's modernization since the late 1970s” (85). Because of these reasons, the 
economic benefits of accepting the refugees greatly outweighed the costs and can effectively explain 
why China adopted its acceptance policy.
2.13. International Status Argument 
The international status argument was effective in explaining China's response to the 
Vietnamese Refugee Crisis. By adopting this large-scale acceptance policy, China was able to enhance 
its own international status, specifically by contributing to nation-building efforts, challenging the 
legitimacy of the Kuomintang, and elevating China's position in the international community. 
Before analyzing how accepting the Vietnamese refugees enhanced China's international status, 
it is important to establish China's international status prior to the refugee crisis. At the onset of the 
crisis, China was undergoing several major transitions. To start, China had just survived the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, which resulted in millions of casualties and widespread domestic 
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instability. Following this turbulent time period, China also fell into a power vacuum. After the death of  
Mao Zedong in 1976, Mao and his “gang of four” effectively lost control over China, but Deng 
Xiaoping, the next up and coming leader, had not yet consolidated his power. The Chinese economy 
was left in shambles after years of neglect and the social harmony within China was torn apart. The 
accumulation of these events greatly undermined the leadership and legitimacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), especially in overseas Chinese communities. China was in dire need of 
nation-building and to reestablish its legitimacy and status in the international community. It was under  
these circumstances that China accepted the Vietnamese refugees. 
Contributions to Nation-Building Efforts
The CCP viewed the Vietnamese refugees as a valuable asset that could contribute to nation-
building efforts. As previously established in both the sections focusing on the ethnic ties and social 
security arguments, China viewed the Vietnamese refugees as part of a larger, overseas Chinese 
community. Even though a good portion of them were Vietnamese nationals, China regarded them as 
Chinese descendants. Because of this, China effectively linked and “contextualized [them] in a broader 
history of Chinese return migration, particularly after the communist victory in 1949 that welcomed 
educated and skilled disasporic Chinese and their progeny to return and contribute to nation-building” 
(Huang X qtd. in Ho 603). 
 China, had in other words, effectively linked these Vietnamese refugees to a group of voluntary 
Chinese returnees that had moved back to China around the same time period to help built a new 
communist China. This is evident in how China labelled the refugees as “returnees” instead of 
refugees, which effectively signified choice rather than forced migration. China discourse also went on 
to described the refugees to be a community of “loyal diasporic descendants” (Zhang qtd. in Ho 603) 
and placed heavy emphasis on their patriotism. By merging these two groups together, China was able 
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to effectively portray and understand both of them as a valuable asset to their nation-building efforts. 
Hence, prompting China's acceptance of these refugees. 
Establish the CCP's legitimacy
In addition to contributing to nation-building efforts, accepting the Vietnamese refugees would 
also assist the CCP in challenging the KMT's legitimacy and win support from overseas Chinese 
communities. Since the Nationalist government was established in 1928, the CCP and KMT have 
engaged in a continuous struggle to secure legitimacy and control over China. As the KMT spread its 
ideology and increased its influence around the world, the CCP had to find ways to reestablish itself as 
the legitimate regime. Accepting the Vietnamese refugees was an effective way to achieve this. 
The CCP and KMT's “political tutelage” (Wu 153) over the Chinese education system started 
after the establishment of the Nationalist government in 1928. Prior to moving its power base to 
Taiwan, the KMT actively targeted Chinese schools, which became one of the key platforms for 
nationalist indoctrination. As stated in in the Living Tree, “Nationwide inculcation of Kuomintang 
ideology in school classes included the teaching of Sun Yet-sen's Three People's Principles and 
speeches of KMT leaders along with lessons on citizenship and patriotism” (153). This active 
promotion of KMT ideology did not only occur inside the classroom, the KMT also introduced a daily 
tradition of a flag salute and national anthem as well as organizing weekly meetings to disseminate  
lectures on Dr. Sun Yatsen's vision and promote national allegiance to the party and to the KMT 
leaders.  
The KMT's efforts were not limited domestically either. After moving its power base to Taiwan,
branch organizations of the KMT party and other Chinese organizations such as the Overseas Chinese 
Commission of the Nationalist government continued to promote KMT teachings and brought this kind 
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of indoctrination to overseas Chinese schools. The KMT's efforts also transcended generations. Till this 
day, the KMT still hosts a variety of cultural and educational activities in North America and Europe.  
While these activities are disguised as a way to preserve and promote the Chinese culture, these 
activities have been effective ways in disseminating KMT teachings and inducing loyalty and support 
for the Nationalist government in Taiwan. 
In order to counterattack the KMT's far-reaching influence, the CCP had to win support from 
overseas Chinese communities and reestablish its own legitimacy. Accepting the large influx of 
Vietnamese refugees was an effective to achieve this. Not only would it reinforce CCP's claim that it is  
the “ancestral homeland” for overseas Chinese communities, it would also allow the CCP to project  
“caring concern” (Gilks 197) for these communities. Launching the full-scale relocation and 
resettlement policy would also send a powerful message to overseas Chinese communities that the CCP 
was willing to reach out extraterritorially to provide, protect, and support all people of Chinese descent 
throughout the world. This would effectively challenge the KMT's legitimacy while elevating China's  
status and support throughout overseas Chinese communities. 
Elevate China's International Standing
Adopting this large-scale acceptance policy also effectively elevated China's status in the 
international community. Fan explains that “As compared with other countries' way of handling refugee 
problems on short-term and temporary basis, the Chinese government's commitment to provide 
permanent protection to every refugee from Vietnam fleeing to China is unparalleled in UN history” 
(Fan 13). By adopting this policy, China was able to display its commitment to international laws and 
its willingness to work as a team player in the international community. It also provided China with 
opportunities to work closely with other international actors and help China build stronger, working 
relations with a variety of international organizations, refugee relief NGOs, humanitarian groups, and 
Dong 36
other states. 
Because China's refugee policies played such a dramatic role in alleviating the refugee crisis, 
it also set a precedent for how the international community should respond to future crises. On May 10, 
2007, “the Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) highly acclaimed the Chinese 
government's efforts to make arrangements for settling the refugees in China, saying that over the past 
30 years or so, China’s placement of Vietnamese refugees within its borders is one of the most 
successful models for settlement of refugees and for allowing them to mingle with local communities” 
(Han).
By adopting these policies, China received recognition and support from the international 
community and effectively elevated its own international status. More importantly, China's far-reaching 
attempts to provide for these Chinese-Vietnamese refugees sent a powerful message throughout the 
overseas Chinese community, highlighting China's commitment to Chinese descendants. It also helped 
the CCP legitimize itself and bolster its image as the rightful homeland for all overseas Chinese. 
2.14 Regional Security/Geopolitics Argument
China's response to the Vietnamese refugee crisis is consistent with the regional 
security/geopolitics argument, especially if China's refugee policies were intended to alleviate the  
explosive, ethnic tensions in Southeast Asia. Since before the outbreak of the Vietnamese refugee crisis,  
Southeast Asia has had a long history of ethnic discrimination and violence against the ethnic Chinese.  
While the Chinese made up of a small percentage of the population in these countries, they control a  
large percentage of the wealth. As Amy Chua in World on Fire pointed out, the Chinese is a “market-
dominant minority.” The Chinese's “market dominance and intense resentment amongst the indigenous 
majority is characteristic of virtually every country in Southeast Asia except Thailand and Singapore” 
(61). This resentment has resulted in widespread persecution, discrimination, and violence against the 
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Chinese. 
These tensions were further aggravated when the Vietnamese refugee crisis broke out and 
thousands of ethnic Chinese refugees flooded into neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. Not only 
did this upset the already sensitive ethnic balance in many of these countries, it also triggered wide-
spread anti-Chinese sentiment. The Malaysian government for example, made it clear that the 
Vietnamese-Chinese refugees, especially those that were ethnically Chinese were not welcome in 
Malaysia. Other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also expressed 
a deep unwillingness to take on the heavy burdens of caring for the Chinese refugees. The 
compounding effects of the anti-Chinese sentiments that had already existed in Southeast Asia and the 
influx of ethnic-Chinese refugees created an explosive situation that undermined the security of the 
region.
As these tensions worsened, frustrations became increasingly directed at China and “triggered 
sensitive relationships with Southeast Asian countries” (Godley qtd. in Ho 603). Because China 
regarded the refugees as “ethnic kin,” many of the countries felt that China was evading its 
responsibilities to provide for them and allowed these issues to spill over into their territories. 
Neighboring states viewed the overseas Chinese communities with suspicion and feared that China's 
“territorial expansion ambitions […] could be realized through the Chinese populations within their  
countries” (Ho Security 60). Because of this, the rising anti-Chinese sentiments quickly transformed 
into anti-China sentiments. As Lee Kuan Yew, the former Prime Minister of Singapore, who is also of 
Chinese descent explained, “The more pressures [that] are placed on these countries, the more the 
balance is upset and the more anti-Chinese and anti-China they become” (Wain). 
These anti-China sentiments also increasingly jeopardized China's regional interests in 
Southeast Asia. Melvin Gurtov in China and Southeast Asia—the Politics of Survival: a Study of  
Foreign Policy Interaction explained that “China's objective in Southeast Asia is the promotion of a 
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militarily quiescent, politically accessible region occupied by weaker (noncompetitive) states that are  
'friendly' and 'non-hostile' (167). These anti-China sentiments increasingly antagonized these Southeast 
Asian countries and undermined China's attempt to “publicize its revolutionary ideology” (169) in the 
region. 
In order to alleviate this increasingly dire situation and restore China's image in Southeast Asia, 
it was a wise move for the Chinese government to accept the Vietnamese-Chinese refugees. Removing 
the refugee presence in Southeast Asia would not only effectively soothe the building anti-Chinese and 
anti-China sentiments, it would also help China reestablish friendly relations with all these countries  
and restore stability in the region. 
2.15 Social Security Argument
The social security argument is equally effective in explaining China's response to the 
Vietnamese refugee crisis. In accordance to the argument, China did not perceive the Vietnamese 
refugees to be a great threat to the social security of China and was thus, more willing to accept them. 
China viewed the refugees as Chinese descendants that were returning back to China. Even 
though the refugees originated from Vietnam, 80% of them were ethnically Chinese and China 
recognized them as part of the greater overseas Chinese community. The refugees' ethnic ties to China 
prompted China to view them as close kin rather than foreigners, even though these sentiments may not 
have been reciprocated. They possessed greater affinity to their adopted homeland than to China. 
“Many of the overseas-born Chinese may not have recognised China as 'home' until the events that 
compelled them to seek refuge there” (Ho Returnee 601). Despite this, many of the refugees were 
familiar with the Chinese culture and spoke regional Chinese dialects such as Cantonese, Hokkien, and 
Fujiannese. In light of these qualities, China believed that the refugees would be able to cohere 
peacefully with local communities. 
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Secondly, the majority of the refugees were relocated to areas that were largely isolated from 
local Chinese communities. While highly skilled and educated refugees were often relocated to cities,  
the rest of the refugees were often settled in areas that were largely rural, undeveloped, and 
uninhabited.  In China As the 'Protector' of Co-Ethnics in Distress: Changing Episodes of Human  
Security Vulnerabilities over Space and Time, the refugee-returnees that were interviewed recollected 
that “they and the voluntary returnees had a rude shock as the trucks transporting them approached the 
remote and underdeveloped villages in which they would be relocated. Some wanted the trucks to bring 
them back to the cities, but the party officials shepherding them to their new homes flatly refused” (Ho 
Security 61). Because most of these areas were remote and far away from other established towns, 
these refugees did not pose a major threat to the local communities or to the social security of the 
region. 
Thirdly, the refugees' contributions to developing China's rural farmlands outweighed the social 
costs of resettling them. The Chinese government endured heavy social costs in the initial resettling of 
the refugees. A United Nations' report explain that, “the presence of a large refugee population in rural 
areas inevitably also means a strain on the local administration. Host country's national and regional 
authorities divert considerable resources and manpower from the pressing demands of their own 
development to the urgent task of keeping refugees alive, alleviating their sufferings and ensuring the 
security of the whole community” (Social and Economic Impact of Large Refugee Populations on Host  
Developing Countries). Since China's resettlement policy was comprehensive and provided the 
refugees with food, water, housing, etc., it inevitably diverted a significant amount resources away 
from the local communities. 
Accepting these refugees however, did not necessarily hinder local governments from 
developing rural areas. In fact, refugees were expected to help develop the land and was assigned to do 
farm work upon their arrival. It was not until later on in the resettlement process that the refugees were 
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allocated salaries for their labor. Initially, the refugees' allocation of food was contingent on the work 
they did on the rural farms. Their contributions to developing China greatly diminished the initial social  
costs of resettling them. 
Finally, China expected a good portion of the refugees to resettle again to third countries.  
Even though China received a large influx of refugees and bore heavy costs in helping them resettle 
into local communities, China also anticipated that many of them will reunite with their extended  
families in other countries. The Foreign Affairs Journal published an article titled, “The Indochina 
Refugee Crisis” that explained that out of the 250,000 Vietnamese refugees that China had accepted,  
Peking estimated that “30,000 ethnic Vietnamese among the refugees wanted to settle in third 
countries.” This did in fact happen. After arriving to China, a large wave of refugees flooded into Hong 
Kong, which was still a British colony at the time. According to Chen Xiaoying's Study on Hong 
Kong's Vietnamese Immigrants from China, this lead the British administration to adopt the dilei 
immigration policy, which states that as long as the refugees can prove that they are reuniting with 
relatives or can find housing, the Hong Kong government would be willing to accept them. 
As the evidence shows, China did not perceive the Vietnamese refugees to be a great threat to 
the social security of China. The fact that the majority of the refugees were ethnically Chinese 
is a driving reason why China did not view them as a threat and is also reminiscent to the ethnic ties 
argument. Because of these reasons, China was more wiling to accept the refugees. 
2.2 North Korean Refugee Crisis 
The first cross-border refugees that entered into China from North Korean occurred in the 
1960s. They crossed the Sino-Korean border in small numbers and did not become a significant issue 
until the 1980s when China formally recognized these border-crossers as refugees (Lam). Despite this, 
the Chinese government continued to turn a blind eye to these refugees for a considerable amount of 
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time after the 1980s. Kathleen E. McLaughlin, in For Refugees in China it pays to be from Burma not  
North Korea, explains that interviews with local Han Chinese citizens residing along the border reveal 
how it was not unusual to see North Koreans crossing the Yalu river in broad daylight to escape 
starvation and political prosecution. Many North Korean teenagers, often called kkotjebi or “fluttering 
swallows,” (Song 162) would temporarily cross the North Korean border into China in search of food, 
and when they were fed, they would return back to North Korea. 
It was not until the North Korean famine in 1997, which caused an estimated 20,000-30,000 
refugees to flood into China, did China initiate major crack downs. Unlike how China chose to handle 
the Vietnamese refugees, China maintained a strict “no acceptance” policy and has been determined to  
repatriate all North Korean “escapees” back to their own country. The Chinese government 
dramatically increased its security measures alongside the Sino-Korean border, authorizing the People's  
Liberation Army to conduct regular patrols along the border. The 2010 Chinese Defence Report Q1 also 
claims that “North Korean police have been seen working with the Chinese to round up refugees.” 
Because many local Chinese families harbor North Korean refugees in their homes, local Chinese 
police forces later “created a net of systemic search and house-to-house arrests” to round up all these 
North Korean refugees (S. Lee 88). Additionally, the Chinese government also restricted the activities 
of international non-profits, relief organizations, and missionary groups, often refusing to allow them to 
set up camp on the Chinese side of the Sino-Korean border to provide aid for North Korean refugees. 
Despite these efforts, North Korean refugees have continued to enter China through the 
northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Jilin. Fleeing from starvation, poverty, and an 
oppressive political regime, many of the refugees move into China through a variety of underground 
networks. Song explains that “Chinese-organized smuggling networks, South Korean missionaries and 
foreign NGO activists have been actively involved in the internal movements of North Korean[s] and 
transporting them across the Chinese borders to neighboring South-East Asian countries” (Song 164). 
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The International Crisis Group also released a report in 2006 explaining how Chinese gangs that used 
to smuggle illegal migrants to Southeast Asia have also jumped on the North Korean smuggling 
business, contributing significantly to the efforts of the 'Seoul Train' underground railroad. Many of 
these refugees flee to third countries, usually in Southeast Asia before finding ways to enter South 
Korea. However, thousands of North Korean refugees continue to live under the radar in China and 
face great risks of being discovered by the Chinese government and repatriated back to North Korea. 
The consequences of being discovered are extremely severe for the North Korean refugees. By 
escaping into China, the refugees will be considered political defectors or traitors to the state when they 
are deported back to North Korea. Because of this, they will likely be sent to concentration camps, 
political prisons, or face public execution upon return. Their family members and relatives would also 
be charged with guilt by association and face similar punishments. Despite this risk of being 
persecuted, North Korean refugees are not guaranteed protection by the international community. 
While the UNHRC recognizes the North Korean escapees as refugees under the refoulement 
clause in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention because the refugees have a well founded fear of 
returning back to their home country, there are major flaws in the UNHRC refugee treaties. First of all,  
refugees must be propelled to leave their home state due to political reasons in order to be granted 
refugee status. Because of this, North Koreans that have escaped because of economic reasons such as 
starvation or poverty do not qualify as a refugee under this clause.  For these reasons, North Korean 
defectors are often described as “international orphans” (S. Lee 83). Secondly, the fate of the refugees 
are determined by the accepting state. Because China viewed the North Koreans as “economic 
migrants” instead of refugees, it has refused to accept the North Koreans even if it is a blatant violation 
of the refoulement clause in the Refugee Convention. 
As a signatory state of the UNHRC refugee treaties, China's strict “no-acceptance” policy of the 
North Korean refugees has ignited international criticism. China has been accused of violating 
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international law in addition to human rights. Nevertheless, China has continued to uphold its strict 
refugee policies. China has only soften its stance when refugees make the world headlines. For 
example, on August 26, 2002, seven North Korean refugees attempted to enter into China's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs headquarters and demanded to be recognized as refugees. The refugees were 
subsequently arrested, but their plight caught the attention of the international media and subjected  
China to intense international pressures. In the end, China released the seven refugees. Even though 
this incident forced China to temporarily accede to international and humanitarian norms, 
Lee warns that “if the wave of embassy invasions continues, China most likely would stop the foreign 
NGO's operations altogether and close off its border with North Korea” (S. Lee 88). This in turn, will 
subject the North Korean refugees to even greater risks and dangers in China. The following section 
will now analyze how effective the five arguments are in explaining China's response to the North 
Korean Refugee Crisis. 
2.21 Ethnic Ties Argument 
Even though the ethnic ties argument is derived from the long-standing Theory of Privileged 
Migration Theory, it is difficult to assess its effectiveness in explaining China's response to the North 
Korean refugee crisis because it is unclear what the argument defines as “ethnic ties,” especially in the 
case of China.
China is an incredibly diverse country and is populated with fifty-six officially recognized 
ethnic groups. The largest of which is the Han ethnicity, which constitutes over 90% of the total 
population in China (Schubert 49). The remaining fifty-five ethnic groups make up the remaining 2% 
of the population with an estimated 105 million people. Many of these ethnic minority groups are 
concentrated in the geographic periphery of China in the north, northwest, northeast, south, and 
southwest.
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While the majority of the Vietnamese refugees were ethnically Han, all of the North Korean 
refugees are ethnically Korean with no ties to the Han ethnicity. The North Korean refugees however, 
do share close kinship ties to the Korean-Chinese or Chaoxianzu ethnicity. The Korean-Chinese are a 
minority ethnic group that resides on the Chinese side of the Sino-Korean border. “There are 
approximately 800,000 ethnic Koreans living in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, the north-
eastern border city in China adjunct to North Korea, and they amount to 36.7 per cent of the Yanbian 
population in 2009” (China Navor qtd. in Song 163). Both the Korean-Chinese and the North Koreans 
speak similar Korean dialects and share a similar cultural heritage.  
In addition to the close kinship ties between the North Koreans and the Korean-Chinese, they 
also share close historic ties. During the turmoil in the 1950-1960s, which resulted in wide-spread 
famine, political purges, and prosecution in China, thousands of Korean-Chinese flooded into North 
Korea to seek help from their relatives. Thus, when a series of natural disasters swept through North 
Korea in the mid-1990s, causing large-scale famine and disease, the Korean-Chinese were prompted to 
help the North Koreans in return. 
The Korean-Chinese have also played an instrumental role in helping other North Korean 
refugees escape into China. In addition to setting up and operating the “Seoul Train,” an underground 
passageway constructed to smuggle North Korean refugees into China, once they arrive, many Korean-
Chinese households also provide for and illegally house them. Because of this, many Korean-Chinese 
have been arrested and detained by Chinese law enforcement.
While the Korean-Chinese share very close ties to the North Koreans, they are recognized by 
the Chinese government as a legitimate Chinese ethnic group. Amelia Schubert, in Contesting 
Koreanness: Migration as a Challenge to the Ethnic Identity of the Korean Chinese, explains that the 
“Korean Chinese were granted their own minzu [or Chinese ethnic identification], along with their own 
administrative region, as early as 1952” (53). Thus, by extension, the North Korean refugees also share 
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ethnic ties to the indigenous Chinese. According to the ethnic ties argument, China should be more 
willing to accept these refugees and provide them with preferential-immigration rights because of their  
ethnicity. Despite this, the Chinese government has continued to enforce its strict policy of non-
acceptance and even taken direct action to round up and deport all North Korean refugees back to 
North Korea. 
Because it is unclear whether the “ethnic ties” in the ethnic ties argument applies strictly to the  
Han ethnicity or can also refer to the Korean-Chinese (Chaoxianzu) ethnicity, it is difficult to determine 
the effectiveness of this argument. But this case study suggests that unless the refugees are ethnically 
Han, the Chinese government will not recognize their ethnic ties to China. Furthermore, unless the 
refugees are Han, the Chinese government will be not grant them preferential immigration rights like in  
the case of the Vietnamese refugees. This role that ethnicity plays in formulating China's refugee 
policies is consistent with Stevan Harrell's argument that the Chinese have “an innate, almost visceral  
Han sense of superiority” (Harrell qtd. in Jacques 316). While Chinese minority policies assert that all 
ethnic groups are treated equally and are bestowed the same rights, in reality, minority cultures are only 
“recognized at a superficial level [and are] not treated as equal of the Han in more substantive matters” 
(Jacques 317). The Vietnamese and North Korean case studies demonstrate the significance of ethnic 
ties in determining China's refugee policies. 
2.22 Economic Argument  
China's response to the North Korean refugee crises is aligned with the economic argument. 
Accepting the North Korean refugees would accrue extremely high economic costs for China because it 
can potentially disrupt all cross-border trade between China and North Korea. Since the economic 
reforms in the early 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party's overriding priority has been economic 
development. As Kahrs argues in Regional Security Complex Theory and Chinese Policy towards  
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North Korea-China, the “Chinese Communist Party has effectively tied its legitimacy to economic 
growth” (70). The Party's legitimacy no longer depends on its revolutionary credentials, but on its 
ability to carry out its promises, especially in improving the living standards of the Chinese people and 
maintaining stability. Failure to deliver will almost indefinitely result in widespread social unrest and  
instability in China. Not only will this directly challenge the Chinese government's capacity to deal  
with this social instability, it will also severely undermine the authority and control of the Chinese  
government.
When the North Korean refugees first started flooding into China in large numbers, the North 
Korean regime appeared to be ready to fully open up its market to China and there was great optimism 
that North Korea was finally ready to embrace international trade and invest in its own development 
(McLaughlin Struggle). Even though this prophecy did not materialize, China has continue to be North 
Korea's most important ally and possesses a near trade monopoly with North Korea. According to 
McLaughlin, cross-border trade between China and North Korea has increased by 20% per year since 
the 1990s. Liu Hongcai, the Chinese ambassador to Pyongyang also explains that “As Pyongyang 
attaches more importance to developing its economy and improving the livelihood of its people, it is  
reaching out for more foreign economic cooperation. Such a need provides business opportunities for 
many Chinese enterprises” (Gill 5). China recognizes that there is immense economic potential in  
North Korea and growing bilateral trade will continue to spur economic growth through Northeast 
Asia.
Because of these growing economic ties, it is too costly for China to accept the North Korean 
refugees. First of all, acceptance of the refugees can disrupt all cross-border trade between China and 
North Korea and jeopardize China's return on its investment in North Korea. China went to great 
lengths to set up a joint steering committee with North Korea to determine the future direction of 
economic cooperation between the two countries. Following the diplomatic meeting between Chen 
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Bingde, China's Minister of Commerce and Jang Sung Thaek, the Director of North Korea's Central 
Administration Department, China and North Korea was finally able to reached a consensus to develop 
several economic trade zones between the two countries. These include the Rason Economic and Trade 
Zone and the Hwanggumpyong and Wiwha Islands, which are located strategically between Raijin and 
Sonbong on the northeast coast of North Korea and along the Yalu River. China anticipates these 
economic zones to greatly facilitate trade between China and North Korea and reap great economic 
benefits for China. 
In addition to developing these trade zones, China has also invested heavily in building the 
economic infrastructure in North Korea to pave the way for facilitate bilateral trade in the future. In  
2011, China started construction on a new four-lane bridge across the Yalu River, costing China 1.8 
billion yuan. China also initiated the construction of a 53.5 km road reconstruction project that would 
stretch between Wonjeong-ri and Rason, costing China an additional 150 million yuan. Apart from 
these two projects, China and North Korea have also established “green channels” (Gill 5) between the 
two countries that ease customs procedures at certain border crossings, making it easier for Chinese 
investors to invest in North Korea. Because of these prior investments, China is extremely unwilling to 
accept any North Korean refugees. Large, uncontrollable flows of refugees across the border have the 
potential to disrupt all cross-border trade and jeopardize future trade relations between China and North 
Korea. 
Secondly, accepting the refugees will disrupt the existing bilateral trade between these two 
countries. As the Chinese ambassador to North Korea revealed, “trade volume between China and 
North Korea has grown six-fold between 2000 and 2009. China’s exports to North Korea nearly 
doubled from 2007 to 2008 alone. Trade between the two countries experienced a slight downturn in 
2009 when the UN imposed sanctions in the wake of North Korea’s nuclear test in 2008. However, by 
2010, trade rebounded and reached its previous levels and will likely continue to expand” (Gills 2).
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Trade between China and North Korea have already expanded to a variety of sectors and 
products. According to Choi in China's Strategic Goals in the Kim Jong-Un Era, “the North has 
expanded its commission-based processing trade for China's clothing and sewing products” (112) and 
there has also been a significant upsurge in China's import of iron ore and briquettes from North Korea. 
Interviews with Louxian International Logistics Co., a Chinese-based company also revealed how 
profitable it is to trade North Korean fish to South Korea and Japan and how Chinese enterprises have 
managed to start businesses by building cement factories inside North Korea (McLaughlin Struggle). 
Because of these current economic ties, China is unwilling to accept North Korean refugees and 
thereby risk disrupting bilateral trade with North Korea. 
Thirdly, China is counting on bilateral trade with North Korea to revitalize the economies of its  
northeast region. If it accepted the North Korean refugees, this could jeopardize the economies in 
China's northeast provinces. In an article about China's New Exit-Entry Law, Chodorow explains that 
“Since 1986, China began to experience a new trend of economic immigration. As China modernizes 
and urbanizes, smaller families are preferred, labor growth is slowing, and elderly population is 
increasing wage pressure and economic immigration.” Because of these trends, China's northeast 
provinces including Liaoning and Jilin have been sites of some of the greatest labor unrest in China. 
To alleviate this situation and spur economic development in the region, China has invested 
heavily in bilateral trade with North Korea. Increasing trade with North Korea has not only helped 
bolster the economies of China's “northeast rust belt,” it also helped distribute wealth throughout other 
parts of northeast China. Bates Gill argues that with “improved economic prospects for northeast 
China, […] local governments and domestic security authorities will be vested in economic 
development and the accompanying reduced likelihood of unrest in this part of the country” (Gill 6).  
Accepting the North Korean refugees could jeopardizes the opportunity to rejuvenate local economies 
and also aggravate labor unrest and instability in northeast China. 
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After a thorough examination of the economic costs associated with receiving the North Korean 
refugees, it is understandable why China refuse to accept them. Unlike the Vietnamese refugees, 
accepting the North Korean refugees could accrue substantially higher economic costs. Not only would 
it severely disrupt the increasing trade relations between China and North Korea, it will also jeopardize 
the Chinese investment in North Korea and confiscate an opportunity to rejuvenate the local economies 
in northeast China. Because of these economic factors, the economic argument is consistent and 
aligned with China's response to both the Vietnamese and North Korean refugee crisis. 
2.23 International Status Argument
The international status argument, which suggests that China's refugee policies are fueled by its 
desire to enhance its international status is ineffective in explaining China's response to the North 
Korean refugee crisis. In fact, China's North Korean refugee policy has resulted in the opposite effect. 
China was chastised by the international community for actively persecuting the North Korean refugees 
and violating their human rights.
 Because China is a signatory state of the UN refugee treaties, China's refusal to accept the 
North Korean refugees has been viewed as a blatant disregard for international law as well as an 
evasion of China's international responsibilities. Even though China has defended itself by reasoning 
that the North Koreans are “economic migrants” instead of refugees and should not be entitled to any 
form of protection from the Chinese government, the UN has not acknowledged this rationale. While 
most of the North Korean refugees are drawn to China because of economic factors, the United Nations 
still regard them as refugees because they will likely face political persecution if deported back to 
North Korea. This is clearly articulated in the Refoulement Clause in Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention, which entitles the refugees to protection and prevents them from being sent back to their  
home country ("Part II Strategic Review Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153"). 
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Despite this, China has continued to carry out its strict policy of “non-acceptance” and has even 
increased its efforts to patrol the Sino-Korean border to round up refugees and actively deport them 
back to North Korea. Because of these actions, China has received great international criticism and 
pressure to reverse its refugee policies. As Sokeel Park also points out in China's North Korean 
Refugee Problem, “China is hemorrhaging soft-power on this issue, alienating the South Korean people 
and government and damaging their reputation before the international community. In the long-run this  
is a strategic mistake” (Park). 
Apart from being criticized for disregarding international law, China has also been under attack 
for violating the human rights of the North Korean refugees. In addition to actively persecuting the 
North Korean refugees, China has also refused to allow the UNHRC, Christian missionary associations, 
refugee-relief NGOs, or even UN investigators access to northeast China where the North Korean 
refugees are concentrated. As a result, organizations like Amnesty International, Anti-Slavery, Good 
Friends, the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch and the US Committee on Human Rights 
in North Korea are unable to provide direct assistance to the refugees. Song explains how this forces 
“NGOs, missionaries and brokers […] to assist the refugees by illegally breaking the PRC's domestic 
jurisdiction and fill in the gaps by transnationally smuggling North Koreans throughout East Asia.” 
Additionally, many “devoted NGO activists [that] have helped North Koreans […] have been arrested 
and detained by the Chinese authorities” (164) .  
China has also been attacked for turning a blind eye on the transnational trafficking of North 
Korean women. Because of China's One-Child Policy, there is a great imbalance in the national gender 
ratio. According to Lampton, “The skewed sex ratio (the number of males born divided by the number 
of females born) in China has become dramatically more unbalanced since the late 1970s, reaching 
119.2:100 in 2000 and 118:100 in 2005” (218). This has lead to an increase in the trafficking of women 
throughout China for prostitution and to be sold as “wives.” North Korean women are particularly 
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vulnerable and have been trafficked throughout China. Despite this, China has failed to protect these 
refugees and trafficked victims, even if many of the North Korean women bear the children of their 
own citizens. An article published through Dajiyuan, a Chinese online newspaper, explained how North 
Korean women that have been impregnated by Chinese men are still forcibly deported back to North 
Korea. They are strung together by piercing barb-wire through their shoulder blades and transported 
back to North Korea. Their babies are forcibly aborted or slaughtered in front of their mothers (Hong). 
China's failure to address the trafficking of these North Korean female refugees not only violate 
International Refugee Law, but also violate multiple clauses in the UN Convention including 
Transnational Organized Crime, the Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, the Palermo Protocol, 
and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air. 
China's refugee policies in the North Korean refugee crisis did not enhance China's international 
status in any obvious way like it did during the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis. In fact, China was attacked 
for its outright disregard for human rights and its violation of international law. Thus, the international  
status argument is only consistent in the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis but is ineffective in explaining 
China's response to the North Korean refugee crisis.  
2.24 Regional Security/Geopolitics 
The regional security/geopolitics argument is one of the most compelling and most commonly 
cited explanations for China's response to the North Korean refugee crisis. It contends that by adopting 
a strict, no-acceptance refugee policy, China will not only be able to maintain border and regional  
security, it will also help China gain an upper hand in the geopolitics in the region. The following 
paragraphs will explore the validity of this argument in explaining China's response to this crisis. 
Border/Regional Security
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Securing the Sino-Korean border and stabilizing the North Korean regime continues to be one 
of China's greatest priorities. Li Guogang, the Deputy Director of the Chinese Academy  explains that 
“China has a single border policy and it's quite simple: stability […] If the borders in China are not 
stable, all of China will be unstable. If the border areas are not developed, all of China will be 
undeveloped” (McLaughlin Struggle). This is particularly true in the case of North Korea. Instability in 
the China-North Korea border can result in instability in China.
 Song argues that “A mass exodus from North Korea may destabilize the [Chinese] north-
eastern border region, where some 800,000 ethnic Koreans have been residing since the late nineteenth 
century” (162). Not only would large inflows of refugees overwhelm domestic policing efforts, the 
refugees would also compete with local populations for vital resources such as food, water, and land. 
As Bates Gill laid out in China's North Korea Policy: Assessing Interests and Influences, “[China's] 
Liaoning and Jilin provinces – that border on North Korea have [already] been the scene of some of the 
greatest labor unrest in China” (6). If refugees flood into Northeast China and compete with the local 
communities for the same jobs, it can bring about a potentially explosive situation in northeast China.  
The presence of a large refugee population can also aggravate ethnic tensions, exhaust environmental 
resources, and raise the crime rate.
Maintaining security alongside the Sino-Korean border is equally critical for the survival of the 
North Korean regime and the stability of Northeast Asia. A large exodus of North Korean refugees into 
Chinese borderlands could destabilize the North Korean regime and threaten to bring about a collapse 
of the entire state. Such a collapse would result in a sudden power vacuum in the region. Since “China, 
Japan, Russia and the US all consider Korea to fall, to some extent, within their own geo-strategic 
sphere,” any changes in North Korea can significantly affect the balance of power in Northeast Asia 
(Kahrs 64). Because of this, many of the surrounding states will be prompted to contend for control 
over the region once North Korea collapses. This struggle for power will result in an “onslaught of 
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regional insecurity” and even potentially lead to war (H. Lee). 
Driven by this fear of destabilizing North Korea, China has already implemented a variety of 
policies to prevent the collapse of North Korea. For instance, in defiance against international 
sanctions, China has more than doubled its humanitarian aid to North Korea. According to Bill Gertz in
“China Doubles Aid to North Korea Under Kim Jong-Un,” Beijing's aid to North Korea “doubled from 
$2.68 billion in 2009 to nearly $6.96 billion in 2014.” China has also invested heavily in building trade 
relations with North Korea in an attempt to induce gradual political and economic reform in North 
Korea. Thus, China's refusal to accept the North Korean refugees may be another preventative measure 
that China adopted to ensure the survival of North Korea as well as the stability of northeast China and 
Northeast Asia. 
Geopolitics
By restricting the flow of North Korean refugees from coming in from the border, China can 
also strengthen its ties with North Korea and increase its influence in the strategic region of Northeast 
Asia. “Northeast Asia is not a straightforward area to look at, because of the difficulty in distinguishing 
between regional and global levels. There is a heavy American military presence, and three of the main 
actors with security interests in the region – the United States, China and the Russian Federation – are 
nuclear weapons states with permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council” (Kahrs 64). 
Northeast Asia also possesses a “heavy concentration of military capabilities, high levels of tension, the 
economic and technological capacity to support a hi-tech arms race,” that can easily jeopardize China's  
interests in the region (64). Because of this, it is in China's best interest to strengthen its ties with North 
Korea and use North Korea to leverage itself in the region. 
Adopting an non-acceptance policy of the North Korean refugees will be an effective way for 
China to strengthen its ties with North Korea. As the previous sections explained, by securing its 
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border, China can help stabilize North Korea and prevent a possible collapse of the regime. It would 
also demonstrate China's commitment to the 1962 Sino-North Korean Border Treaty, which requires 
China to repatriate all illegal, North Korean migrants back to North Korea. By strengthening ties with 
North Korea, China can effectively increase its influence in Northeast Asia. 
First of all, China's exclusive access to North Korea will help leverage itself over other major 
powers in the Northeast Asian region. As the only state that shares a close communist “brotherhood” 
with North Korea, the repressive 'Hermit Kingdom,' China yields significant influence over the state. 
Because of this, China has taken advantage of its exclusive access to North Korea and served as the 
outside world's link to the regime. For example, China was one of the only states that was able to 
convince North Korea to participate in the Six-Party Talks, which was focused on urging North Korea 
to demilitarize and eliminate its nuclear program. According to Lampton, China supplies North Korea 
with the majority of their energy resources. By cleverly employing a “technical problem” on one of the 
oil pipelines, China “use[d] this supply interruption to create pressure to Pyongyang to join multilateral  
talks about its nuclear efforts” (110). Even though the Six-Party Talks ultimately failed, China's close 
ties to North Korea significantly increased China's influence in the region. 
While recent reports claim that China's leverage over North Korea is rapidly diminishing and 
the old revolutionary ties and ideologies between the two states are no longer influential, China still  
yields significantly more leverage over North Korea than other states. For instance, an NBC coverage 
of Secretary of State, John Kerry's recent visit to South Korea explains that “The key to everything is 
China […] China is the only one with leverage [over North Korea]” (China: the ‘only ones with 
leverage’ on North Korea). China also continues to exert a certain level of influence over North Korea 
because of North Korea's economic dependence on China. Not only has China more than doubled its 
humanitarian aid to North Korea in the last few years, it is also responsible for nearly 90% of the North 
Korean economy (McLaughlin Trade). With North Korea facing sanctions from the UN and multiple 
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other bilateral sanctions from South Korea, Japan, and the United States, North Korea has increased its 
reliance on China. Because of this, China adopted its strict repatriation policy of North Korean refugees 
as a way to preserve the remaining leverage that it has over the North Korean state and to maintain its  
position of influence in Northeast Asia. 
Secondly, developing closer ties with North Korea can give China a greater say in the terms of 
reunification if North Korea were to collapse. As Kahrs explains, “In the longer term, the surrounding 
countries wish to prevent a reunified Korean from tilting towards one of the other powers in the region. 
The degree of external support for reunification would largely depend on the circumstances leading to 
unification and the nature of the process itself” (68). Driven by the fear that after the collapse of North 
Korea, the Korean peninsula will be dominated by external powers that pose a threat to China's national 
security and territorial integrity, China is determined to prevent other states from increasing their  
presence in the region. This is especially the case with the United States, which still maintains close 
relations with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan and effectively surrounds the Chinese state. China fears 
that following a collapse of North Korea, the United States will build an anti-China coalition in the 
western Pacific. In order to prevent this scenario from manifesting and to maintain its influence in the 
region, China was prompted to secure its close ties with North Korea and reject the North Korean 
refugees.
Thirdly, repatriating the North Korean refugees back to North Korea can also help China restrict 
the United States' current presence in Northeast Asia. As Professor Niu in Introduction to History of  
Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (1949-2000)  explained, history has demonstrated 
that China has rarely been able to tolerate global powers like the United States and the Soviet Union in 
close proximity to Chinese borders. Even though the Cold War has ended, the Korean War is one of the 
only conflicts that is still 'hot,' prompting China to continue viewing American presence near its  
borders as a great threat. By maintaining close relations with North Korea, China hopes that “North 
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Korea [will] evolve into a new strategic buffer zone […] protecting Chinese security and economic 
interests” (Choi 107) and keeping the United States at a distance from China.  
Finally, by maintaining its strict deportation policy, China can also restrict both American and 
western influence in China. A large presence of North Korean refugees naturally attract a variety of 
international human rights, refugee relief, and religious organizations. If China accepted all the North 
Korean refugees, these organizations would flood into northeast China and set up camp alongside the 
Chinese side of the Sino-Korean border. Having such a strong western presence in China, especially 
along this strategic border between China and North Korea, would be extremely unsettling for China. 
Seymour explains that “Those who help illegal immigrants are prosecuted under the Chinese 
jurisdiction and, furthermore, from the Chinese and North Korean perspectives, NGOs are seen as 
political or sectarian, anti-communist, anti-DPRK and “Christian fundamentalist[s]” (Seymour qtd in  
Lee 163). To prevent this scenario from occurring, China adopted a non-acceptance refugee policy. 
China's refusal to accept the North Korean refugees is very much aligned with the regional 
security/geopolitics argument. Adopting this refugee policy will not only help maintain stability within  
China, it will also prevent instability alongside the Sino-Korean border and in North Korea. It can also 
strengthen China's ties with North Korea and allow China to gain political leverage over North Korea 
and enhance its own position in the geopolitics and balance of power in Northeast Asia. 
2.25 Social Security Argument 
China's response to the North Korean Refugee Crisis is aligned with the social security 
argument, which suggests that China's a strict, no-acceptance policy of the North Korean refugees is 
fueled by concerns about social security within the Chinese state. Hypothetically, the social costs of 
accepting the North Korean refugees should be much greater than the social cost of accepting the 
Vietnamese refugees. This appears to be the case, especially because the North Korean refugees are not 
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ethnically Chinese. 
The North Korean refugees' cultural background would pose a great challenge for them to 
integrate into Chinese society. Unlike the Hoa, the North Koreans were unable to speak local and 
regional Chinese languages and were unfamiliar with Chinese culture. This makes it very difficult for 
the North Koreans to become positive contributors to China – both economically and socially. For 
instance, the Vietnamese refugees could fill in jobs in the medical and teaching fields almost  
immediately after relocating because of their language abilities and skill sets. The North Korean 
refugees on the other hand, would need a significant amount of language and job training in order to be 
employed in China. Their presence would also become a great burden to local communities. 
China also feared that the refugees would disrupt the social security in the region by 
aggravating ethnic tensions between the Korean-Chinese residing on the border and the Han Chinese. 
The ethnic tensions between the Korean-Chinese and the Han trace back to the years following the 
Cultural Revolution. Schubert explains that before the Cultural Revolution, the Yanbian area, an 
autonomous Korean region in northeast China, had a relatively high standard of living. But the 
economic growth in the region stagnated by the end of the 1970s while the rest of China's urban 
economy exploded. Thus, “a sense of relative poverty, combined with resentment over Cultural 
Revolution grievances, resulted in previously rare conflicts between Korean Chinese and Han” 
(Schubert 43). 
Beijing has an ingrained fear that accepting the North Korean refugees will escalate these 
existing tensions. Many Korean-Chinese have already shown defiance against the Chinese government 
by actively helping North Korean refugees escape from North Korea and illegally housing them in their 
own homes. The Chinese government is also wary that the growing number of ethnic Koreans in 
Yanbian “may link to other minorities such as Uyghurs or Tibetans” and threaten China's minority 
policies (163). Kahrs in Regional Security Complex Theory and Chinese Policy towards North Korea-
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China also argued that as these ethnic tensions grow, there is “potential for economic problems to 
intersect with ethnic tensions and [cause a] knock-out effect in other parts of China” (73). 
Due to the fact that the North Korean refugees were not ethnically-Han, China viewed the social 
costs of accepting the North Korean refugees to be extremely high. Consequently, China was unwilling 
to accept the refugees, fearing that it would cause instability.  
    Chapter Three: Analysis
Out of these five arguments, four of them were consistent with China's response to the two 
refugee crises. The international status argument is the only one that is clearly ineffective in explaining 
China's refugee policies. By accepting the Vietnamese refugees, China greatly elevated its international  
status. This helped the CCP challenge the legitimacy of the KMT and establish itself as the rightful  
homeland for the Chinese. China also received recognition and support from the international 
community, most notably with the UNHRC. China's response to the North Korean Refugee Crisis on 
the other hand, brought about the opposite effect. China's active persecution and repatriation of the 
North Korean refugees did not enhance its international status in any obvious way. In fact, China was 
attacked by the international community for its violation of international law and disregard for human 
rights. This discrepancy invalids the international status argument.  
The remaining four arguments, ethnic ties, economic development, social security, and
 regional security/geopolitics, are valid explanations but range in their effectiveness to explain China's  
policy decisions. The regional security/geopolitics is the weakest of the four. While it was incredibly 
compelling in the North Korean case, it was much less convincing in the Vietnam crisis. China's 
response to the North Korean Refugee Crisis drew on several layers of analysis. Not only was China 
concerned about its own border security, it also feared that the North Korean refugees would threaten 
Dong 59
regional and global security. Application of the regional security/geopolitics argument on the 
Vietnamese Refugee Crisis on the other hand centered around a single rationale, which was to subdue 
ethnic tensions in Southeast Asia. The regional security/geopolitics argument provides a much more 
convincing explanation for China's response to the North Korean Refugee Crisis than it did for the 
Vietnamese Refugee Crisis. 
The remaining three arguments are the most compelling of the five. The ethnic ties, economic,  
and social security arguments clearly show how the corresponding absence and presence of the same 
factors account for the discrepancy in China's policy response. For example, the ethnic ties argument 
contends that China adopted the policies it did because the Vietnamese refugees were Han-Chinese but 
the North Korean refugees were not. China viewed itself as an ancestral homeland to the Hoa and felt
compelled to protect them. But it did not share this same sense of responsibility for the North Korean 
refugees.
Furthermore, the social security argument shows how the social costs of accepting the North 
Korean refugees were substantially higher than the costs of accepting the Vietnamese refugees. Unlike 
the Hoa who were ethnically Chinese and could speak various dialects like Mandarin, Cantonese, and 
Hakka, the North Korean refugees were unfamiliar with Chinese culture and unable to speak Chinese 
languages. This made it significantly more difficult for North Korean refugees to integrate into Chinese 
society than Vietnamese refugees. Additionally, because the North Korean refugees were not Han, 
China feared that their presence would upset the ethnic balance in the northeastern provinces and 
aggravate ethnic tensions between the Korean-Chinese and the Han. Due to the difference in social 
costs of accepting each refugee group, it is rational for China to adopt the policies that it did. 
This same logic appears in the economic argument. The economic costs of accepting the North 
Korean refugees were notably higher than the economic costs of accepting the Vietnamese refugees. In 
fact, the Hoa brought a variety of economic benefits to China. They filled specialized jobs, attracted 
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investments into China, and also played an invaluable role in opening up and developing China 
throughout the 1980s. Accepting the North Korean refugees on the other hand, would jeopardize all 
cross-border trade between China and North Korea. The refugees would also compete with local 
Chinese citizens for jobs in regions that already experience high levels of labor unrest and instability. 
This stark difference in the economic cost of accepting North Korean refugees versus the Vietnamese 
refugees helps explain why China responded the way it did. 
While the ethnic ties, social security, and economic arguments provide convincing explanations 
for China's policies, it is important to note that there are some obvious overlaps between these three 
arguments. Because the Chinese government had effectively tied its own legitimacy to economic 
development and recognized economic growth as the key to maintaining social security, the economic 
argument can be merged into the social security argument. Ethnic ties and social security then are the 
main driving factors of China's refugee policies. 
This, however, does not imply that ethnic ties and social security are the only factors that are 
essential to understanding how China responds to refugee crises. China is unlikely to accept, resettle, 
and provide for tens of thousands of Vietnamese refugees solely because they can potentially contribute 
to the development of China. The Chinese government is equally unlikely to repatriate all North 
Korean refugees and jeopardize its international status simply because they are not Han. Isolating these 
two key factors is only the beginning of the story. These two factors are as much the key drivers of 
Chinese refugee policy as they are the starting point for how China evaluates refugee crises. If the crisis
involves refugees that are ethnically Chinese, China will adopt an approach centered around ethnic ties.  
But if the refugees are not ethnically Han, China will prioritize security and stability when formulating 
its refugee policies. Ethnic ties and security then, form the foundation for how China evaluates and 
makes sense of other significant factors such as regional security, geopolitics, and international status. 
For example, China's response to the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis is much more compelling 
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when ethnic ties become the core of the explanation. Concerns about China's international status 
suddenly become a much greater consideration once the refugees involved are of Chinese descent 
because China's treatment of the refugees will directly affect its status and legitimacy in overseas 
Chinese communities. Similarly, because the refugees are ethnically Chinese, it alleviated much of  
China's fears about social security. The Chinese government was confident that because of the refugees' 
ethnic and cultural ties to China, they were unlikely to cause unrest in the Chinese society and would 
be able to integrate easily with local Chinese communities. The refugees also provided China with a 
gateway to tap into the economic and intellectual wealth of overseas Chinese communities. Finally,  
China felt compelled to intervene in the refugee crisis because the Vietnamese-Chinese refugees  
aroused anti-Chinese and anti-China sentiments that threatened to destabilize Southeast Asia.  
Reexamining the five arguments through ethnic ties paints a much more complete picture of why China 
adopted its acceptance policy during the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis.  
This same pattern appears in the North Korean Refugee Crisis. China's response is much more 
compelling when security/stability becomes the core of the explanation. Because the North Korean 
refugees are not ethnically Han, the Chinese government feared that they would severely undermine the 
social security of the region. Not only would the North Korean refugees face challenges in integrating 
into Chinese society, they would also aggravate existing ethnic tensions between the Korean-Chinese 
and the Han-Chinese. Accepting the North Korean refugees will also severely disrupt all cross-border 
trade between China and North Korea and destabilizing the border. This in turn, can undermine the 
stability of the North Korean regime and jeopardize the security of Northeast Asian. Placing 
stability/security as the core of the explanation helps map out the interplay between these five factors  
and reveals a much more complete and credible explanation for China's response to the North Korean 
Refugee Crisis. 
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Chapter Four: Conclusion
Identifying ethnic ties and security/stability to be the major factors that shape China's refugee 
policy reveals key information about how China views itself and its relationship with the rest of the 
world. By prioritizing ethnic ties and security/stability it is evident that China's refugee policies are still  
largely China-centric and driven by self-interest. It also shows that China continues to view refugee 
crises as a predominantly state-to-state affair rather than a regional or even global issue. China is yet to 
recognize the amount of power and influence it holds in refugee crises. It is perhaps the only state in 
the entire region whose domestic policies can have implications on a regional or even global scale.  
Because of this, Asian refugee crises present an invaluable, springboard opportunity for China to 
establish itself as a reputable and influential leader in both Asia and the world.
What China needs to recognize is that the handling of refugee crises is an adaptive challenge 
(Heifetz) rather than a policy issue. Asian refugee crises are not isolated, individual occurrences. They 
are part of a much bigger systematic issue in the region that 1) creates refugees and 2) lacks the 
institutional capacity to effectively absorb and handle them. While it is relatively easy to solve each  
refugee crisis in a state-to-state manner and on a case-by-case basis, refugee crises can not be resolved 
by adopting the "right" refugee policy. No matter how many North Korean refugees China arrests and 
repatriates back to North Korea, it still can not resolve this crisis and the impending threat to its own 
security. Devoting all these resources in securing its border with North Korea also can not prevent other 
refugee groups from flooding into its porous borders. Even though it is difficult to accept, the handling 
of Asian refugee crises will not be solved by quick and easy solutions. They will need a significant 
amount of time to implement and will require changes in approaches, beliefs, values, and even relations  
between China and the rest of Asia. But it is precisely a challenge that is as formidible as this one that 
calls upon China. Few other states in the region can lead in the face of a challenge that is as complex, 
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diverse, and widespread as this one. 
China already shows great ambition in becoming a key leader in Asia. This is evident in 
Chinese slogans like the "peaceful rise" and the "China Dream," which convey images of a new and 
powerful China that is ready to emerge onto the world stage as a leader. It is also highlighed in China's 
role as a global, economic powerhouse or even in bestsellers like Martin Jacques' provocative When 
China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. What 
stands between the current China and a global leader however, are three obstacles. First, as Lampton in 
Three Faces of Chinese Power explained, China faces distinct challenges to developing internally 
while maintaining domestic security. Second, while China is confronting a variety of internal  
challenges, "the outside world is making demands on it to conform to a variety of international 'norms' 
[and responsibilities] that did not exist when Europe and the United States developed" (Lamptom 209).  
Third, China has yet to find a balance between exhibiting its growing strengths without alienating or 
threatening surrounding countries. The recent growth in China's military capabilities, its territorial  
claims in the South China Sea, and even its proposed plans to build a "New Silk Road" have aroused 
suspicion and fear from other Asian states. China needs to find a way to increase its influence in the 
region in a more effective and less threatening way. Stepping up and leading efforts to redefine how 
Asia should handle refugee crises is an effective way to overcome these obstacles. 
As Lampton laid out earlier, the international community imposes a variety of expectations and 
standards on China, often claiming that China has yet to fulfill its role as a "responsible stakeholder" in 
the world (Lampton 274). While China has remained passive in response to these claims, it is partly 
responsible for how it is portrayed on the world stage. But instead of just complying to these 
established norms, China can take ownership of the pressing, refugee issues and use them to redefine 
its own role and responsibilities in the region. This is not to say that China should evade the 
responsibilities that it already committed to in the UNHRC and regional Asian refugee agreements, but  
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it should embrace its own alternative approach to dealing with refugees.
The main reason why most Asian states are not signatories of the UNHRC treaties is because 
the agreements were overly Eurocentric and unsuitable to handle Asian refugee crises. Regional 
refugee agreements provide an alternative to these treaties, but only serves as a loose guideline for how 
states should respond. As a result, refugee crises are still handled on a voluntary basis with most of the 
responsibility falling on the hands of individual states. Asia desperately needs its own unique, 
institutional approach to handling refugee crises and China can be the leader in making this a reality. 
Taking on this challenge can help China win support from not only the Asian states but also the 
international community. Because humanitarian affairs are less sensitive than issues in economics or 
security, it will be easier for China to rally support and cooperation in tackling refugee crises. This will  
help China portray a more humanitarian image of itself and wash away its past record of human rights 
violations. It will also be extremely conducive to helping China win support and build trust with the 
West.  
By taking this initative, China can also show that it is compassionate for the suffering in Asia.
As evident in its past refugee policies, China's main considerations have been largely driven by self-
interest. Its emphasis on ethnic ties in particular, projects an "us" versus "them" mentality, favoring 
ethnic Chinese refugees over all other Asian refugees. If China can convince other states that it is 
capable of placing the regional interests of Asia above its own self-interests, at least in the issue of 
refugees, China will be able to gain a lot respect in the region. Similarly, if China can show the Asian 
states that it cares about their well-being as much as its own development, it will greatly alleviate the  
sense of threat and danger that other states feel towards China. 
By establishing this mutual trust between itself and other Asian states, China will able to more 
effectively develop its own soft power and influence as a leader. It can become the state that other 
Asian countries seek guidance from in humanitarian affairs and be the state that helps redefine the 
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responsibilites and norms of how to tackle Asian refugee crises. These efforts in turn, will directly 
benefit China by ensuring greater human security around its borders and throughout Asia. 
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